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DEMOCRACY BASIC STRUCTURE OF OUR CONSTITUTION –Vs-             ADMINISTRATION OF THE LOCAL BODIES./ excellant Article by R.SINGGARAVELAN Senior Advocate madras high court

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DEMOCRACY

BASIC STRUCTURE OF OUR CONSTITUTION –Vs-             ADMINISTRATION OF THE LOCAL BODIES.

  1. PRELUDE:-

In State of U.P. –Vs- Jasvir Singh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 288 at para 15 Justice R.V.Raveendran as he then was held in a louder voice declared as follows:-

“Greater the power, greater should be the responsibility in exercising such power.”

Justice Mr. Swatanter Kumar in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd –Vs- State of U.P. reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354 at para 218 has specifically declared as to  how the responsibility should be in the following words:-

“Greater the Power to decide, higher is the responsibility to be just and fair.”

But actually what is happening in our Democracy is that the one who is vested with the Greater Power except very few always is willing to show their loyalty to the ruling party not to the people who having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Republic Social Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens Justice, Liberty Equality, Fraternity adopt, enact and give to themselves the Constitution of India. As a result lot of Panchayats face their day to day problem as they could not be able to function freely, fairly and fearlessly in case the head of such bodies belongs to a party other than the ruling party or even an Independent candidate.

The Unwritten hidden Rule is that either they have to belong to the Ruling Party or they should belong to the parties supporting the ruling parties. This is the attitude of almost all the ruling parties and there is no exception to that. May be the percentage of gravity of the troubles given to the other party candidate or independent candidate may differ marginally. There  may be  exceptions to this general tendency and I am not on exceptions but on the common practice adopted  by the persons in power to the Constitutionally created statutory body.

 

  1. SELF GOVENANCE OF THE LOCAL BODIES:-

The Panchayats, Panchayat Union and the Municipalities are the creation of our Constitution and they are conferred with constitutional status under Article 243 of the Constitution of India. They are supposed to have the self government in the interest of the people of the Village Panchayat of course within the framework of law framed by the State Government. Various welfare schemes are implemented only through the elected bodies like the Panchayat both by the State and Central Government. As the money flow is constant and the implementation of welfare scheme involves the expenditure of huge money the political parties have their eyes on the governance of the local bodies.

When the representatives of the ruling party or its allied parties succeed the Head can continue happily for the entire tenure of 5 years without any problem and in case the local people knowing fully well about the character of the candidates standing for their Ward and Panchayat as the circle is very small selects the service oriented selfless candidate, either independent or the candidate of other party then the head ache started for the Head of such bodies by creating legal obstacles on their way under the penal provisions of the Act.

 

  • LAW OF THE LAND:-

In this connection the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tarlochan Dev Sharma –Vs- State of  Panjab & others reported in (2001) 6 SCC 206 at  Page 268 at Para 7 are more opt to be quoted here and accordingly they are quoted below:-

“7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within Section 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of Section 22, on the ground of “abuse of his powers” (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case.”

Again at Pages 272 and 273 at Paras 14, 15 and 16, the Hon’ble Apex Court in its own style criticised the conduct of the bureaucrats in the following words:-

“14. Although the appellant tried to suggest a case of mala fides and colourable exercise of power by stating a few facts and inviting a finding that the impugned order was passed with an ulterior motive inasmuch as the appellant’s election to the office of the President did not suit the powers that be and the political bosses of Shri N.K. Arora, the then Principal Secretary, Department of Local Government, State of Punjab, however, we are not entering into that question as it is unnecessary and also because adequate material has not been brought on record and placed before the Court so as to undoubtedly arrive at such a finding. However, something has to be said about Shri N.K. Arora, Principal Secretary who initiated the action, heard the appellant and passed the impugned order of removal dated 1-10-1999.

  1. It is interesting to view the present-day bureaucrat-politician relationship scenario:

“A bureaucratic apparatus is a means of attaining the goals prescribed by the political leaders at the top. Like Alladin’s lamp, it serves the interest of whosoever wields it. Those at the helm of affairs exercise apical dominance by dint of their political legitimacy.… The Ministers make strategic decisions. The officers provide trucks, petrol and drivers. They give march orders. The Minister tells them where to go. The officers have to act upon instructions from above without creating a fuss about it.”

(“Effectiveness of Bureaucracy”, The Indian Journal of Public Administration, April-June 2000, at p. 165)

  1. In the system of Indian democratic governance as contemplated by the Constitution, senior officers occupying key positions such as Secretaries are not supposed to mortgage their own discretion, volition and decision-making authority and be prepared to give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead at the behest of politicians for carrying out commands having no sanctity in law. The Conduct Rules of Central Government Services command the civil servants to maintain at all times absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing which is unbecoming of a government servant. No government servant shall in the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise of power conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. In Anirudhsinhji Jadeja [Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 902] this Court has held that a statutory authority vested with jurisdiction must exercise it according to its own discretion; discretion exercised under the direction or instruction of some higher authority is failure to exercise discretion altogether. Observations of this Court in Purtabpore Co. Ltd. [Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr., Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 308 : AIR 1970 SC 1896] are instructive and apposite. Executive Officers may in exercise of their statutory discretions take into account considerations of public policy and in some context, policy of a Minister or the Government as a whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy but they are not absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for instructions by a superior to bind them. As already stated, we are not recording, for want of adequate material, any positive finding that the impugned order was passed at the behest of or dictated by someone else than its author. Yet we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order betrays utter non-application of mind to the facts of the case and the relevant law. The manner in which the power under Section 22 has been exercised by the competent authority is suggestive of betrayal of the confidence which the State Government reposed in the Principal Secretary in conferring upon him the exercise of drastic power like removal of President of a Municipality under Section 22 of the Act. To say the least, what has been done is not what is expected to be done by a senior official like the Principal Secretary of a wing of the State Government. We leave it at that and say no more on this issue.”
  2. PANCHAYATS ACT 1994 – REMOVAL POWER:-

Let us see now how an elected President or Vice-President is able to be removed by an executive order under Section 205 and Section 206 respectively of the Tamilnadu Panchayats Act by the District Collector.

Section 205 which speaks for the removal of the President as follows:-

“205. Removal of President. – (1) The Inspector –

(a) of his own motion, or

(b) on a representation in writing signed by not less than two-thirds of the sanctioned strength of the Village Panchayat containing a statement of charges against the President and presented in person to the Inspector by any two of the members of the Village Panchayat, is satisfied that the President willfully omits or refuses to carry out or disobeys any provision of this Act, or any Rule, bye-law, Regulation, or lawful order made or issued under this Act or abuses any power vested in him, the Inspector shall,by notice in writing, require the President to offer within a specified date, his explanation with respect to his acts of omission or commission mentioned in the notice.

(2) If the explanation is received within the specified date and the Inspector considers that the explanation is satisfactory, he may drop further action with respect to the notice. If no explanation is received within the specified date or if the explanation received is in his opinion not satisfactory, he shall forward to the Tahsildar of the taluk a copy of the notice referred to in sub-section (1) and the explanation of the President if received within the specified date with a proposal for the removal of the President for ascertaining the views of the Village Panchayat.

(3) The Tahsildar shall then convene a meeting for the consideration of the notice and the explanation, if any, and the proposal for the removal of the President, at the office of the Village Panchayat at a time appointed by the Tahsildar.

(4) A copy of the notice of the meeting shall be caused to be delivered to the President and to all the members of the Village Panchayat by the Tahsildar at least seven days before the date of the meeting.

(5) The Tahsildar shall preside at the meeting convened under this section and no other person shall preside thereat. If, within half an hour appointed for the meeting, the Tahsildar is not present to preside at the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to a time to be appointed and notified to the members and the President by the Tahsildar under sub-section (6).

(6) If the Tahsildar is unable to preside at the meeting, he may, after recording his reasons in writing, adjourn the meeting to such other time as he may appoint. The date so appointed shall be not later than thirty days from the date so appointed for the meeting under sub-section (3). Notice of not less than seven clear days shall be given to the members and the President of the time appointed for the adjourned meeting.

(7) Save as provided in sub-sections (5) and (6), a meeting convened for the purpose of considering the notice and the explanation, if any, and the proposal for the removal of the President under this section shall not, for any reason, be adjourned.

(8) As soon as the meeting convened under this section is commenced, the-Tahsildar shall read to the Village Panchayat the notice of the Inspector and the explanation if any, of the President [and the proposal for the removal of the President], for the consideration of which it has been convened.

[(8-A) There shall be no debate in any meeting under this section.]

(9) The Tahsildar shall not speak on the merits of the notice or explanation nor shall he be entitled to vote at the meeting.

(10) The views of the Village Panchayat shall be duly recorded in the minutes of the meeting and a copy of the minutes shall forthwith, on the termination of the meeting, be forwarded by the Tahsildar to the Inspector.

(11) The Inspector may, after considering the views of the Village Panchayat in this regard, in his discretion either remove the President from office by notification with effect from a date to be specified therein or drop further action.

(12) The Government shall have power to cancel any notification issued under sub-section (11) and may, pending a decision on such cancellation, postpone the date specified in such notification.

[(13) Any person in respect of whom a notification has been issued under sub-section (11) removing him from the office of President shall, unless the notification is cancelled under sub-section (12), be ineligible for election as President until the expiry of three years from the date specified in such notification as postponed by the order, if any, issued under sub-section (12).]

Section 206 speaks about the removal of the Vice-President in the following words:-

  1. Removal of Vice-President. – (1) If in the opinion of the Inspector, the Vice-President willfully omits or refuses to carry out or disobeys any provisions of this Act or any Rule, bye-law, regulation, or lawful order made or issued under this Act or abuses any power vested in him, the Inspector shall, by notice in writing, require the Vice-President to offer within a specified date, his explanation with respect to his cases of omission or commission mentioned in the notice.

(2) The provisions of sub-sections (2) to (13) (both inclusive) of section 205 shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the removal of the Vice-President as they apply in relation to the removal of the President by the Inspector on his own motion.”

A cursory glance at the above provisions would shock the conscience of anyone who knows the value of democracy and independence how a democratically elected President or Vice-President by the people, for the people and of the people can be removed even within few months of his election to the constitutionally created statutory body in the name of various allegations levelled against him.

It is to the remembered that there is no such drastic action for the removal of a Ward Member and it is to be noted that all the transactions of the Panchayat or any Local Body including all expenditure of the Panchayat can be carried out only on the basis of the resolution passed by the majority of the Ward Members of the Panchayat. Neither the President nor the Vice-President can take any independent financial action for the welfare of the Panchayat without the approval of the majority of the member of the Panchayat. When the President and the Vice-President can function only on the basis of the majority resolution it is not known as o how they alone can be singled out and made to face the stigmatic action which would affect their right to stand for the election again under Sections 205 and 206 of the Act.

It is the fundamental principle of Democracy that the elected member can be removed only by election and if not by the Court of Law in case they face serious criminal charges, which ended in conviction. It is not known as to how they are placed in the hands of the District Collector who has to be even officially as per their Service Rules be loyal only to the Government failing which their continuance would become questionable. In this connection the categorical and unequivocal observations made in Tarlochan Dev Sharma –Vs- State of  Panjab & others reported in (2001) 6 SCC 206 at para 7 reproduced already in this written brief are relevant to be rememberedd.

The Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of the State of Tamilnadu –Vs- S.Ramasamy in 2011 reported in 2011 (5) CTC 197 has elaborately discussed the case laws on Section 205 when the Government choosing to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of removal and held as follows while confirming the order of the learned Single Judge:-

    “17. The scope and ambit of the powers under Section 205 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act was considered by one of us (D. Murugesan, J.) in V. Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by Secretary to Government, Rural Development, 2001 WLR 617. It was held that the order of the Inspector of Panchayat rejecting the views of the Village Panchayat should be supplemented by reasons.

  1. The issue regarding the manner of exercise of power under Section 205 was earlier referred to a Full Bench of this Court. The Full Bench in District Collector, Villupuram District v. Devi Parasuraman, 2009 (4) CTC 609, considered Section 205 of the Act in extenso and observed thus:

“15. … Therefore, under Section 205, if the Inspector being satisfied with the explanation drops the proceeding, he should record it in the proceeding. In case of unsatisfactory explanation or non-explanation, the Inspector cannot take a decision of his own, but required to forward the matter to the Tahsildar for the decision of the Village Panchayat. It is the Village Panchayat, which records reasons in its minutes of the meeting. Normally the Inspector has to act on such decision. In such case, reason being on record, for acceptance of such report no further reason required to be recorded by the Inspector. However, in case the Inspector differs with the decision of the Village Panchayat, to test the reasonableness of such decision, the Inspector is not only supposed to record the reason, but also required to follow the Rules of Natural Justice by communicating the reasons to the President by giving an opportunity to explain before coming to a conclusion.”

  1. In Devi Parasuraman [supra], the Full Bench summarised the views thus:

“In the light of the discussions made above, we summarise our views as follows:

(i) An act of the Inspector under Section 205 is quasi-judicial in nature;

(ii) If the Inspector is satisfied with the explanation submitted by the President under Section 205, he is required to record his satisfaction for dropping the proceeding; and

(iii) If the Inspector differs with the views expressed by the Village Panchayat and decides to remove the President or to drop the proceeding against the President, he is not only required to record the reasons for differing with the views of the Village Panchayat, but before taking any decision to remove the President, the Inspector is also required to provide further notice to the President intimating the reasons for difference and can issue notification only on consideration of cause, if any, shown by the President.

  1. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, 2001 (6) SCC 260, the Supreme Court was considering Section 22 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1991, regarding the removal of the President on the grounds of “abuse of his powers or of habitual failure to perform his duties”. The Supreme Court held that proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirements of Natural Justice and the curtailment of statutory term of the holder of office cannot be made in a routine manner.

After holding so, the Hon’ble Division Bench has chosen to confirm the order of the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of the District Collector on the ground that the views of the Panchayat were taken lightly by the District Collector in the following words:-

“24. The ultimate order passed by the Inspector of Panchayat under Section 205 would result in Civil consequences to the affected party. In case the President was removed by the Collector in exercise of his power under Section 205 of the Act, he would be ineligible for election as President until the date on which notice of the next ordinary elections to the Village Panchayat is published, or the expiry of one year from the date specified in such notification as postponed by the order or unless the said order is set aside by the Government. Therefore, the Inspector of Panchayat was expected to consider the matter in an unbiased manner. The Inspector of Panchayat has to evaluate the entire materials, including the views expressed by the members of Panchayat in the light of the particular misconduct alleged against the President. The order should contain reasons which actually prompted the Inspector of Panchayat to take a decision one way or the other. It is all the more necessary in case proceedings were initiated suo motu. If elected members are removed from public office very casually, it would shake the confidence of the common man in the very system and the local self-Government would lose its significance.

  1. The Panchayats were constituted by the Constitution [73rd Amendment Act, 1992]. Parts IX and X were inserted with a definite purpose. Parliament in its wisdom wanted to confer power to the people. The States on their part implemented the provisions contained under Parts IX and X either by amending the existing laws or by making new legislations. Therefore, any provision which seeks to take away the administration from the hands of the elected representatives should be interpreted in a strict manner.
  2. The order impugned in the Writ Petition does not contain any indication as to why the Inspector of Panchayat was not inclined to accept the views expressed by the Village Panchayat. The members present at the Village Panchayat unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the Respondent. The Inspector of Panchayat took their views very lightly and ignored it altogether and removed the Panchayat President from office unceremoniously. These aspects were considered by the learned single Judge. We do not find any error or illegality in the order, setting aside the Notification dated 30 April 2010.”
  3. GUIDELINES BY THE HON’BLE APEX COURT FOR USING THE DRASTIC PROVISIONS LIKE SECTIONS 205 & 206 OF TAMILNADU PANCHAYAT ACT, 1994:-

In yet another case called Sharda Kailash Mittal –Vs- State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 319,  the Hon’ble Apex Court has at paras 23 to 27 held as follows as to how to deal  with provisions like Sections 205 and  206 of the Tamilnadu Panchayats Act, 1994:-

“23. As directed earlier, Section 41-A of the Act gives power to the State Government to remove the President, Vice-President or Chairman of a Committee on four broad grounds, namely, (a) public interest; (b) interest of the Council; (c) incapability of performing his duties; and (d) working against the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. In addition, under Section 41-A(2), the State Government at the time of removal from office may also pass an order disqualifying the person from holding the office of the President, Vice-President or Chairman for the next term. The question to be determined is what is the scope of the application of Section 41-A and what is the nature of power of the Government?

  1. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260] this Court while dealing with the removal of a President of the Council under the Punjab Municipal Act of 1911, held in para 7 as under: (SCC pp. 268-69)

“7. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. … Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held.”

In para 11 this Court observed as under: (Tarlochan Dev Sharma case [(2001) 6 SCC 260] , SCC pp. 270-71)

“11. … A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving dishonesty of intention is…. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision.”

The same consideration must be taken into account while interpreting Section 41-A of the Act. The President under the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 is a democratically elected officer, and the removal of such an officer is an extreme step which must be resorted to only in grave and exceptional circumstances.

  1. For taking action under Section 41-A for removal of the President, Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, power is conferred on the State Government with no provision of any appeal. The action of removal casts a serious stigma on the personal and public life of the office-bearer concerned and may result in his/her disqualification to hold such office for the next term. The exercise of power, therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status of an office-bearer.
  2. There are no sufficient guidelines in the provisions of Section 41-A as to the manner in which the power has to be exercised, except that it requires that reasonable opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the office-bearer proceeded against. Keeping in view the nature of the power and the consequences that flows on its exercise it has to be held that such power can be invoked by the State Government only for very strong and weighty reason. Such a power is not to be exercised for minor irregularities in discharge of duties by the holder of the elected post. The provision has to be construed in strict manner because the holder of office occupies it by election and he/she is deprived of the office by an executive order in which the electorate has no chance of participation.
  3. In the present case, the actions of the appellant, even if proved, only amount to irregularities, and not grave forms of illegalities, which may allow the State Government to invoke its extreme power under Section 41-A.”

The brief could not be considered to be completed if the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Raviyashwant Bhoir –Vs- District Collector & others reported  in (2012) 4 SCC 407 is omitted to be quoted. At paras 22 to 37 quoted below the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly picturised the action in against the elected representatives taken by the bureaucrats to cool the heels of the ruling party and its impact in  the following words:-

“22. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-A confers upon the local self-government a complete autonomy on the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control. Thus, exercise of any power having effect of destroying the Constitutional institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the democratic set-up of this country. Therefore, an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose. The Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the institution.

  1. The democratic set-up of the country has always been recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution, like other features e.g. supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, principle of separation of powers, power of judicial review under Articles 32, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, etc. [Vide Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461] , Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [(1980) 3 SCC 625 : AIR 1980 SC 1789] , Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms [(2002) 5 SCC 294 : AIR 2002 SC 2112] , Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election Matter) [(2002) 8 SCC 237 : AIR 2003 SC 87] and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India [(2006) 7 SCC 1 : AIR 2006 SC 3127] .]
  2. It is not permissible to destroy any of the basic features of the Constitution even by any form of amendment, and therefore, it is beyond imagination that it can be eroded by the executive on its whims without any reason. The Constitution accords full faith and credit to the act done by the executive in exercise of its statutory powers, but they have a primary responsibility to serve the nation and enlighten the citizens to further strengthen a democratic State.
  3. Public administration is responsible for the effective implication of the rule of law and constitutional commands which effectuate fairly the objective standard set for adjudicating good administrative decisions. However, wherever the executive fails, the Courts come forward to strike down an order passed by them passionately and to remove arbitrariness and unreasonableness, for the reason that the State by its illegal action becomes liable for forfeiting the full faith and credit trusted with it. (Vide Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Officers’ Welfare Council v. State of U.P. [(1997) 1 SCC 701 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 194 : AIR 1997 SC 1451] and State of Punjab v. G.S. Gill [(1997) 6 SCC 129 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1475 : AIR 1997 SC 2324] .)
  4. “Basic” means the basis of a thing on which it stands, and on the failure of which it falls. In democracy all citizens have equal political rights. Democracy means actual, active and effective exercise of power by the people in this regard. It means political participation of the people in running the administration of the Government. It conveys the state of affairs in which each citizen is assured of the right of equal participation in the polity. (See R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India [1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 : AIR 1993 SC 1804] .)
  5. In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [(2003) 4 SCC 399 : AIR 2003 SC 2363] , this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 457-58, para 94)

“94. The trite saying that ‘democracy is for the people, of the people and by the people’ has to be remembered forever. In a democratic republic, it is the will of the people that is paramount and becomes the basis of the authority of the Government. The will is expressed in periodic elections based on universal adult suffrage held by means of secret ballot. It is through the ballot that the voter expresses his choice or preference for a candidate. ‘Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue’, as observed by [the] Court in Lily Thomas v. Speaker, Lok Sabha [(1993) 4 SCC 234] , (SCC pp. 236-37, para 2) quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary. The citizens of the country are enabled to take part in the government through their chosen representatives. In a parliamentary democracy like ours, the Government of the day is responsible to the people through their elected representatives. The elected representative acts or is supposed to act as a live link between the people and the Government. The people’s representatives fill the role of lawmakers and custodians of the Government. People look to them for ventilation and redressal of their grievances.”

  1. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 : AIR 1999 SC 2378] , this Court considered the issue of removal of an elected office-bearer and held that where the statutory provision has very serious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions. All the safeguards and protections provided under the statute have to be kept in mind while exercising such a power. The Court considering its earlier judgments in Mohinder Kumar v. State [(1998) 8 SCC 655 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 79] and Ali Mustaffa Abdul Rahman Moosa v. State of Kerala [(1994) 6 SCC 569 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 32 : AIR 1995 SC 244] held as under : (Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 : AIR 1999 SC 2378] , SCC p. 199, para 28)

“28. … It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed.”

  1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in G. Sadanandan v. State of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1925 : 1966 Cri LJ 1533] held that if all the safeguards provided under the statute are not observed, an order having serious consequences is passed without proper application of mind, having a casual approach to the matter, the same can be characterised as having been passed mala fide, and thus, is liable to be quashed.
  2. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158].] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office-bearer.
  3. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self-government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office-bearer can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry.
  4. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required.
  5. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the President of the Municipal Council on similar grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed that removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. The elected office-bearer must not be removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or electoral college. His removal may curtail the term of the office-bearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come under any political pressure.
  6. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed.
  7. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC 80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC 1222] ).
  8. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.
  9. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which he has been elected and he can be removed only on a proved misconduct or any other procedure established under law like “no confidence motion”, etc. The elected official is accountable to its electorate as he has been elected by a large number of voters and it would have serious repercussions when he is removed from the office and further declared disqualified to contest the election for a further stipulated period.”

After dealing with the provisions providing for the removal of the elected members at length in the above paras the Hon’ble Apex Court at paras 68  and 69 has held as follows:-

“68. To conclude, we are of the considered opinion and that too after appreciation of the entire evidence on record that the first charge proved against the appellant for not calling the meeting of Council, did not warrant the order of removal and the explanation furnished by the appellant could have been accepted. Other charges could not be proved against the appellant in view of the fact that the tenders at a higher rate were accepted by the Council itself and the appellant could not be held exclusively responsible for it.

  1. Respondent 5, being a political rival, could not have been entertained as a party to the lis. The charge of not calling the meeting of the Council had been admitted by the appellant himself, thus, no further evidence was required, for the reason, that the admission is the best evidence. The competent authority could have considered his explanation alone and proceeded to take a final decision. So far as the other charges are concerned, as has been observed hereinabove, it had been a collective consensus decision of the Council to accept the tender at higher rate and the appellant could not have been held guilty of the said charges.”

On the basis of the above categorical decision, one can very safely arrive at a conclusion that in case the President or Vice-President on the basis of the decision taken by the majority of the Panchayat or other Local Body, then there cannot be any action under Section 205 or 206 as the President or Vice-President has acted only in accordance with the decision of the majority. But the above provisions unmindful of the value of the democracy and the baic structure of our constitution have provided for the removal the duly elected candidate under Sections 205 and 206 of the Tamilnadu Panchayats Act, 1994.

Unfortunately, when Section 205(11) was put to challenge in L.Amudha vs. the State of Tamilnadu reported in 2015-1-L.W.97, the Hon’ble Division Bench has chosen to dismiss the writ by referring to the Full Bench judgment in the case  of Devi Parasuraman reported in 2009 (4) CTC 609 and the Division Bench Judgment in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.Ramasamy case reported in 2011 (5) CTC 197 when both the decisions do not deal with the challenge to a statutory provision like Section 205 or 206in the following words;-

 “11. In our view, the principle hurdle the petitioner faces is the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Ramasamy case, 2011-2-L.W. 1000, supra, which, in turn, relies upon the Full Bench of this Court in District Collector, Villupuram District v. Devi Parasuraman’ case, supra. In view of the observation of the Full Bench of this Court, judicial discipline would require us not to differ with the view of the Full Bench and we would be bound by it. To accept the contention of the petitioner would really amount to over-ruling the view of the Full Bench of this Court.

  1. We, thus, dismiss the petition, in view of the judicial views already pronounced qua the challenge laid in this petition by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Ramasamy, 2011-2-L.W. 1000 and the Full Bench of this Court in District Collector, Villupuram District v. Devi Parasuraman, 2009-4-L.W. 778. No costs.”

In fact as per the concern expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court  in Tarlochan Dev Sharma, Sharda Mittal and Ravi Yashwant Bhoir referred to above and quoted, Section 205(11) should have been struck down or read down to the extent of the power given to the Collector to over ride even the majority view of the Panchayat against the removal of the duly elected representative.

  1. WITHDRAWAL OF CHEQUE SIGNING POWER UNDER THE ACT:-

Apart from the proceedings for the removal now a days the Collector pending Section 205 proceedings also issues the orders withdrawing the cheques signing power of the President or Vice-President as the case may be under Section 188 or Section 203 of the Tamilnadu Panchayat Act, 1994 referring to the pendency of proceedings under Section 205 or Section 206 as against them as the case may be.

When Section 188 speaks about the withdrawal of the cheque signing power, Section 203 does not even utter any word about the Cheque or Cheque Signing Power. Section 203 speeks aout the emergency powers of the Collector in the following words:-

“203. Emergency powers of Collector and Inspector. – [Subject to such control as may be prescribed, the Inspector or the Collector may, in cases of emergency, direct or provide for the execution of any work, or the doing of any act which a Panchayat or Executive Authority or Commissioner or [Secretary] is empowered to execute or do and the immediate execution or doing of which is in his opinion necessary for the safety of the public and may direct that the expense of executing such work or doing such act shall be paid by the person having the custody of the Village Panchayat Fund or the Panchayat Union (General) Fund or the District Panchayat (General) Fund in priority to any other charges against such Fund except charges for the service of authorized  loans.]”

 

Thus, it is manifestly clear that Section 203 positively empowers the Collector to do an emergent work through the Panchayat positively and urgently.

Section 188 is reproduced entirely to show that clause (3) of  Section 188 alone speaks about the Cheque Power only and them to only to the limited extent:-

“188. Village Panchayat Fund. – [(1)] The receipts which shall be credited to the Village Panchayat Fund shall include –

[(a) the house-tax and any other tax or any cess or fees levied under sections 171 and 172;]

[(b) the profession tax levied by Village Panchayats under Chapter IX-A;]

(c) [***]

[(d) the proportionate share of the proceeds of the [***] surcharge on the duty on transfers of property and Entertainments Tax received by the Village Panchayat under sections 169 and 175-A;]

(e) [***]

(f) the taxes and tolls levied in the village under sections 117 and 118 of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 (Tamil Nadu Act VIII of 1939);

(g) fees levied in public markets classified as Village Panchayat markets after deducting the contributions, if any, paid by the Village Panchayat to the Panchayat Union Council on the scale fixed by the Government;

(h) the contribution paid to the Village Panchayat by Panchayat Union Councils in respect of markets classified as Panchayat Union markets;

(i) fees for the temporary occupation of village-sites, roads and other similar public places of parts thereof in the Panchayat Village;

(j) fees levied by the Village Panchayat in pursuance of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder;

(k) income from endowments and trusts under the management of the Village Panchayat;

(l) the net assessment on service inams which are resumed by the Government;

(m) [***]

(n) income derived from Panchayat Village fisheries;

(o) income derived from ferries under the management of the Village Panchayat;

(p) unclaimed deposits and other forfeitures;

(q) a sum equivalent to the seigniorage fees collected by the Government every year from persons permitted to quarry for road materials in the Panchayat Village;

(r) all income derived from porambokes the user of which is vested in the Village Panchayat;

(s) where the Panchayat Village is in a ryotwari tract, all income derived from trees standing on porambokes although the user of the porambokes is not vested in the Village Panchayat;

(t) income from leases of Government property obtained by the Village Panchayat;

(u) fines and penalties levied under this Act by the Village Panchayat or at the instance or on behalf of the Village Panchayat;

(v) all sums other than those enumerated above which arise out of, or are received in aid of or for expenditure on any institutions or services maintained or financed from the Village Panchayat fund or managed by the Village Panchayat;

[(w) such other moneys as may be specified by the Government.]

[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(1), the Government may direct any Village Panchayat to constitute separate funds to which shall be credited such receipt as may be specified and such funds shall be applied and disposed of in such manner as may be prescribed.]

(3) Subject to such general control as the Village Panchayat may exercise, from time to time, all cheques for payment from Village Panchayat Fund [***] shall be signed jointly by the President and Vice-President and in the absence of the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by the Vice-President or the President and another member authorised by the Village Panchayat at a meeting in this behalf.”]”

  • SECTION 188(3) -Vs-  SECTION 203

Thus when the provision Section 188 is clear that the power has to be given only to the other elected member authorized by the Village Panchayat at a meeting and not to the executive officer who is a Government Officer, it is not known as to how Section 203 is pulled in by the Collector for the withdrawal of the cheque signing power which is in the Statute Book for entirely different positive and creative purpose for carrying out certain works emergently from the Village Panchayat Fund as per the order of the Collector.

It is the settled principle of law that when a provision prescribes a particular method to be followed in a particular manner it is not only that the said method alone has to be followed but also the except that method no other method can be followed. The reference can be easily made to the following case laws:-

  1. (2021) 6 SCC 707 = AIR 2021 SC 753 – OPTO Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis Bank.
  2. (2015) 10 SCC 241. – Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar.
  3. (2015) 4 SCC 544. – Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Mackinnon Employees Union.
  4. (2007) 5 SCC 85. – Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P.

For the immediate perusal the observations of the Hon’ble Apex in OPTO Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis Bank) reported in (2021) 6 SCC 707 , they are reproduced below to support the above proposition:-

“14. This Court has time and again emphasised that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner alone and in no other manner. Among others, in a matter relating to the presentation of an election petition, as per the procedure prescribed under the Patna High Court Rules, this Court had an occasion to consider the Rules to find out as to what would be a valid presentation of an election petition in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad [Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266] and in the course of consideration observed as hereunder : (SCC p. 273, para 17)

“17. … It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner.”

Therefore, if the salutary principle is kept in perspective, in the instant case, though the authorised officer is vested with sufficient power; such power is circumscribed by a procedure laid down under the statute. As such the power is to be exercised in that manner alone, failing which it would fall foul of the requirement of complying with due process under law.”

If we apply the above settled principle of law to the case in hand, one can easily arrive at a conclusion that Section 188(3) alone speaks about the Cheque withdrawal power under certain circumstances and the assignment of the same to other elected member.

Whereas Section 203 speaks about the Emergency Power of the Collector to do an emergent work for the safety of the public. In Coimbatore District, Section 203 is being used by the Collector very casually to withdraw the cheque signing power by the Collector and nearly 7 to 8 elected President of the other party and the Independent Candidate has been facing such Section 203 which is sub-judice on the file of the High Court.

But, when a case of withdrawal of cheque signing power under Section 188 and 203 came up for consideration, the Hon’ble Division Bench without dealing with the scope of Section 203 has held that the ‘opportunity of being heard’ has to be given before the withdrawal of the cheque signing power in the following words in Pugazhendran –Vs- B.G.Balu reported in 2005 (1) CTC 545 at paras 28, 29, 30 &  31 has held as follows:-

“28. In view of the above discussions, we are of the opinion that G.O.Ms. No. 92 dated 26.3.1997 is not violative of Section 188(3) of the Act and the two can be read harmoniously as stated above.

  1. In the present case a perusal of the order of the District Collector, Vellore (Inspector of Panchayats, Vellore) dated 7.11.2002 cancelling the power of the Vice President to sign the panchayat’s cheques as joint signatory, shows that the District Collector has merely acted on the recommendation of the Block Development Officer, Katpadi Panchayat Union, and he has not applied his mind independently to the facts of the case, and he has not come to any independent conclusion that the refusal to sign cheques by the Vice President was mala fide or for ulterior motives. The District Collector, Vellore, without issuing notice to the petitioner, appears to have mechanically accepted the report of the Block Development Officer, Katpadi Panchayat Union, which in our opinion was not proper.
  2. In paragraph-4 of the petitioner’s affidavit it has been specifically alleged that no notice was given by the District Collector before passing the impugned order, and this allegation has not been denied by the Collector in his counter affidavit. In our opinion, the District Collector’s order dated 7.11.2002 has civil consequences, and hence it was incumbent on him to give a show cause notice to the petitioner before passing it, which was not done. Hence, in our opinion, there was violation of the principles of natural justice, and the impugned order becomes illegal.
  3. The District Collector, Vellore should have given a show cause notice and an opportunity of hearing to the Vice-President (which need not have been a personal hearing as already stated above), and after considering the explanation and other materials submitted by the Vice-President, he should have applied his mind independently and in a fair and impartial manner, and should have recorded his own reasons in the order he passed. Since that does not appear to have been done in the order of the District Collector, Vellore dated 7.11.2002, in our opinion, the said order was rightly quashed. The matter is remanded to the District Collector, Vellore to pass a fresh order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Vice President and President of the Panchayat, and others concerned, and after recording his reasons. This should be done very expeditiously by the District Collector, Vellore.”

The same was followed in two more cases by the Hon’ble Division Bench on different occasions held as follows:-

“(1)   C. Ashok Kumar –Vs- The District Collector dated 05.01.2011.

 

(2) P.Suganthi –Vs- The District Collector cum Inspector of Panchayat & another reported in 2011 (2) CTC 38.”

 

The above cases also do not deal with the scope of Section 203 and whether it is justifiable to invoke Section 203 for the cheque signing power. It is trite that when there is a specific provision like Section 188(3), another provision in Public Interest cannot be pressed into service at all by any one.

  • PANCHAYAT MEETING UNDER THE HEAD OF THE TASILDHAR:-

In one of the cases the Coimbatore Collector without framing his subjective satisfaction has simply forwarded his notice under section 205 and the President’s explanation to the concerned Tahsildar to convene a meeting to take a decision on the removal of the President.

At paras 7 & 8 of the short judgment the Hon’ble Mr.Justice N.Sathish Kumar understanding the ground reality of the case has passed a short but sharp order as follows;-

“7. For initiation of the proceedings or for removal of the President or Vice President, it is for the District Collector to form an opinion either to accept the explanation or reject the explanation. In the event, the explanation is rejected, then he may forward a copy of the notice to the Tahsildar as per Section 205 of the Act along with charges framed against the President or Vice President as the case may be. Without forming an opinion or indicating whether an explanation is accepted or rejected, mere direction cannot be issued to the Tahsildar to ascertain the views.  On such receipt of the notice, from the District Collector as per Section 205 (2) of the Act, the Tahsildar shall then convene a meeting for consideration of the notice and explanation, if any and proposal for removal of the President of a Village Panchayat. Besides, the notice of meeting shall be served to the President and all the members of the village panchayat atleast seven days before the date of the meeting and only after complying these provisions, the meeting schedule can go on. Thereafter, the views of the members of the village panchayat can be recorded in the minutes of the meeting and the same can be forwarded to the District Collector by the Tahsildar. These are all the mandatory procedure to be followed before taking any action for removal of the President or Vice President as the case may be. In view of the foregoing discussions, the impugned order, on a perusal, does not fall within any of the procedure contemplated.

  1. The 4th respondent has appeared before this Court and produced the original files. On perusal of the same, no material is available to substantiate the respondent case.”

In respect of other President of another Panchayat of the same District, against the same nature of notice the Hon’ble Mr.Justice Anand Venkatesh in his usual manner has whipped the action taken by the Collector and the Tahsildar by referring to the Hon’ble Apex Court judgments above quoted  in a detailed manner as follows:-

“14. The removal of a duly elected member who is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he is elected, is a very serious matter which has serious repercussions for the person against whom such an action is resorted to.  The elected member can be removed in only exceptional circumstances and that to after strict adherence to the statutory provisions.  If there is any infraction in following the procedure, this Court exercising its writ jurisdiction will have to interfere with the same so as to ensure that the elected member is removed from office only in accordance with law.  The issue with regard to the removal of an elected office bearer was considered by the Apex Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir-s case referred supra.  The Apex Court has made it abundantly clear that an elected office bearer must be put on a higher pedestal and should not be treated like a Government servant.  Hence, the strict adherence to the procedure as contemplated under the relevant enactment is a sine qua non for initiating proceedings to remove an elected office bearer.

  1. In the instant case, after the explanation was given by the petitioner for the notice issued by the second respondent u/s 205 of the Act, on 31.03.2022, there is absolutely no material to show that the Collector had gone through the same and had formed an opinion that the explanation is not satisfactory. The materials available before this Court shows that the second respondent has straightway forwarded the file to the Tahsildar and the Tahsildar has resorted to the procedure for ascertaining the views of the Village Panchayat by issuing the impugned proceedings dated 06.04.2023. This in the considered view of this Court is a clear infraction of Section 205(2) of the Act.  That apart, there is no indication in the impugned proceedings that the notice issued by the second respondent and the explanation given by the petitioner along with the relevant documents and opinion formed by the Collector was forwarded to the members whose views are sought to be ascertained.  This is yet another infraction that can be ascertained from the impugned proceedings of the fourth respondent.
  2. In the light of the above discussion, this Court has absolutely no hesitation to interfere with the impugned proceeding of the fourth respondent in Na.Ka.No.6484/2022/Aa1 dated 06.04.2023 and the same is hereby quashed. The matter is sent back to the second respondent and the second respondent shall follow the proper procedure as indicated herein above and shall take further course of action strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
  3. In the result, this writ petition is allowed in the above terms. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.”
  4. DOCTRINE OF READING DOWN:-

In the background of the cases referred to above and the day to day development of retaliating and vindictive political scenario, it is unavoidable to read down Sections 205 and 206 to save democracy and prevent the constitutional mischief so as to make those provisions to convey that the Collector can resort to any action under those provisions only in case of the independent decision taken by the President or Vice-President leading to any irregularity or illegality without the support of the majority members of the Panchayat. The majority support of any act of the elected Head cannot be turned against the Head alone and the only way is to dissolve the Board itself and order for reelection.

 

Even if the President or Vice-President acted independently and thereby invited action under Sections 205(1) or 206, when the matter is placed for due consideration of all the members the action has to be dropped in case of majority support in favour of the President or Vice-President and if the Collector feels that there are ample evidences to hold against the Head he can lodge a complaint against them in accordance with law in the competent court of law on criminal side which may even deter the elected Head and keep them to function with the frame work of law. On lodging such a Criminal Complaint for any serious financial irregularity or illegality other than the administrate lapses untainted by any motive for personal gain the cheque signing power can be withdrawn and entrusted to other elected member of the Board suggested by the majority. Then on conviction during their tenure what is being followed for the elected MLAs and MPs on conviction may be followed for the Head of the local bodies. Any other drastic action of the removal of the elected Head by an administrative head of the District may lead to serious consequences and make the democratic set up of a system itself mockery.

 

In this connection, it is absolutely necessary to remember the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court at paras 68 and 69 of the judgment in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 which warrants the Reading down of Sections 205 or 206 as the case may be unavoidable in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ravi Yashwant  Bhoir –Vs- District Collector & other reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 already referred to the different place at paras 68 & 69 again reproduced below for all convenience.

 

“68. To conclude, we are of the considered opinion and that too after appreciation of the entire evidence on record that the first charge proved against the appellant for not calling the meeting of Council, did not warrant the order of removal and the explanation furnished by the appellant could have been accepted. Other charges could not be proved against the appellant in view of the fact that the tenders at a higher rate were accepted by the Council itself and the appellant could not be held exclusively responsible for it.

  1. Respondent 5, being a political rival, could not have been entertained as a party to the lis. The charge of not calling the meeting of the Council had been admitted by the appellant himself, thus, no further evidence was required, for the reason, that the admission is the best evidence. The competent authority could have considered his explanation alone and proceeded to take a final decision. So far as the other charges are concerned, as has been observed hereinabove, it had been a collective consensus decision of the Council to accept the tender at higher rate and the appellant could not have been held guilty of the said charges.”

 

Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court more or less has conveyed the clear message that when the majority supports the Head when various welfare schemes are implemented then no action can be taken later against the Head or Vice-President alone.

 

  1. CONCLUSION:-

It is for the State Legislature and the Constitutional Courts to consider the plight of the elected Head and provide sufficient legal and constitutional safeguards in their favour atleast for protecting the decision of the majority of the common people of the concerned Panchayat and thereby save the basic Structure of our Constitution, Democracy and self governance by the Local Bodies.

 

R.SINGGARAVELAN

Senior Advocate

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