IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

 

W.P. No.            of 2023

 

Congregation of the Regular Tertiary Franciscans of

Our Lady of Bon Secours,

Represented by its President,

Bon Secours Convent,

Matha Church Road,

Mylapore, Chennai – 600 028,

Chennai District.                                                                                                                              … Petitioner

Vs.

1. The State of Tamil Nadu

Represented by the Secretary to Government

Education Department

Fort St. George, Madras – 9

 

2. The State of Tamil Nadu

Represented by the Secretary to Government

Law Department

Fort St. George, Madras – 9

 

3. The Commissioner of School Education

DPI Campus, College Road,

Chennai-6.                                                                                                           …Respondents

 

 

AFFIDAVIT OF REV. SR. MARIA PHILOMI  

 

I, Rev. Sr. Maria Philomi, D/o. Mr.Anthony Muthu, Christian, aged 62 years, having office at Bon Secours Convent, Matha Church Road, Mylapore, Chennai – 600 028, Chennai District and do hereby solemnly affirm and sincerely state as follows:

1. I am the President of the petitioner society herein. I am

acquainted with the facts of the case. I am filing this affidavit on behalf of the

petitioner.

2. I humbly submit that the “The Congregation of the Regular Tertiary Franciscans of Our Lady of Bon Secours” is a Catholic religious Congregation, constituted exclusively by the Catholic nuns. For the purpose of legal perpetuity, the said Congregation is registered as a society, bearing

Registration S. No. 100 of 1956, in the name and style of “Congregation of the Regular Tertiary Franciscans of Our Lady of Bon Secours”.  The said Congregation has established and is administering a number of educational institutions, including colleges and schools, for the welfare of the development of women and girl children, with a special focus on the Catholic

Christian Community. All the said educational institutions are Minority Educational Institutions (MEI), under Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. The Mother General is the ex-officio President of the registered society and is the ex-officio General Manager/the Secretary of all the educational institutions, under the said educational agency.

3. I humbly submit that, the petitioner is part of the Catholic Church, which is a minority religious denomination under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. The said Christian denomination is running the following

educational institutions, in Tamil Nadu:

 

 

A. Catholic  Aided Schools
Primary Schools	1092
Middle Schools	409
High Schools	302
Higher Secondary Schools	341
Anglo Indian Schools	22
School for Special Students	120
Total	2286
B. Catholic Unaided Schools
Nursery	186
Matriculation High Schools	183
Matriculation Higher Secondary Schools	162
Teacher Training Institutes	20
Total	551
Grand Total of A & B	2837

 

Through all these institutions, the Catholic Church is contributing to the nation building under the Constitutional scheme of Governance. The

petitioner is one among the many educational agencies, functioning under the Catholic Church.

4. I humbly submit that the petitioner is the educational agency for the said religious congregation and it is involved in the empowerment of the poor and especially of Christian Women. For this purpose, the petitioner has established and is administering a chain of schools throughout India and, especially in Tamil Nadu. As observed in para 1 of the M.A. Pai Foundation case, the petitioner is convinced that education is the “single most powerful tool for upliftment and progress” of the poor and the minority communities. Some of the schools of the petitioner were established even before a century, while most of the schools, run by the petitioner pre-date the

Constitution.

5. I humbly submit that the following educational institutions are established and administered by the above said religious congregation, The

Congregation of the Regular Tertiary Franciscan Sisters of Our Lady of Bon Secours in Tamil Nadu:

a) Primary School			–           11
b) Nursery and Primary			–           16
c) Middle School			–             7
d) High School			–             7
e) Higher Secondary School			–           14
f) Matriculation School			–             7
g) Matriculation Hr. Sec. School			–             3
h) CBSC			–             1
i) Deaf and Dumb School			–             1
j) Teacher Training Institute			–             2
Total			—— –           69
——

Though established for the welfare of Christian minorities, all the said schools are imparting secular education. Admission to the said schools is open to all, irrespective of caste and creed. All the schools are recognized by the

competent educational authorities.

6. I humbly submit that for the purpose of administrative

exigencies, the parent society in Registration S. No. 100 of 1956, at Madras, has registered unit societies, depending on the need of the institutions. All the unit societies share the common objects of the parent society. The president of the parent society Registration S. No. 100 of 1956, is also the president of all the unit societies. Except the number of the unit society, including the name of all the unit societies are in common. Accordingly, the petitioner society namely ‘Congregation of the Regular Tertiary Franciscans of Our Lady of Bon Secours’ was created in the year 1956 and in that context, four of its schools, as mentioned in the annexure to the writ petition, are under the immediate control of the petitioner society.

7. I humbly submit that it is pertinent to note that all these institutions are established by the petitioner, for educational, religious and charitable purposes, under Art. 26(1)(a) and Art. 30(1) of the Constitution, because “education is a recognised head of charity” as held in para 26 of the T.M.A. Pai Foundation Catholic Church, being a religious and philanthropic organization, considers education as a mission for the upliftment of the society and as a powerful instrument for nation building. In the case of the petitioner, the said educational institutions have been established and are being administered as per the constitutional right, guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India.
8. I humbly submit that the Governing Body of the petitioner educational agency is comprised only of Catholic Nuns from “Congregation of the Regular Tertiary Franciscans of Our Lady of Bon Secours” of the Roman Catholic Church. From the very beginning till date, no other person of any other faith or religion has been a member in the Governing Body of the petitioner. It is an exclusive religious body for the purpose of membership. All the above said educational institutions are established and administered only by this petitioner, which is exclusively comprised by the persons of

Christian religion. As per Government Census 2011, Christianity is a minority religion, comprised of 6.1% of the total population in Tamil Nadu. This fact is accepted by the Government, vide G.O. Ms. No. 375 dated 12.10.1998. The state as the unit for deciding the minority status is reaffirmed in TMA Pai Foundation case, as reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481. Thus, all the schools of the petitioner in Tamil Nadu have the intrinsic minority character required under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. The Government has issued G.O. Ms. No. 109, dated 29.12.2022, stipulating the procedure for issuance of minority status certificate, in respect of minority institutions.

9. I humbly submit that the petitioner has evolved over the years, a well-oiled and time-tested management structure, for running the educational institutions. The Governing Body of the petitioner is the Apex Body for the educational institutions. However, as the said society is involved in multiple charitable activities, in the realm of religion, culture and social work, it has an effective Educational Executive Committee, for the purpose of running the day-to-day administration of schools. It  functions under the guidance of the Governing Body of the society of the petitioner. The Educational Executive Committee is empowered by the educational agency to conduct the administration of the schools. All the members are appointed or nominated by the President of the Governing Body, by nature of their ex-officio operation or designation in the petitioner society. The Educational Executive Committee is presided by the Educational Counsellor or the Provincial as the case may
11. I humbly submit that, there is a separate Educational Board, which is advisory in nature. It has representation from the different educational institutions of the Corporate educational agency. It has to discharge its duties under the guidelines and the framework stipulated by the Educational Executive Committee. The individual institution functioning under the aegis of the society, are bound by the directions of the Educational

Executive Committee. However, they will follow the guidelines of the Educational Board, wherever necessary and also avail its services, for imparting wholistic education. Thus, the administration of the petitioner educational agency, has a three level structure, such as the Governing Body, the Educational Executive Committee and the Individual Institutions.

11. I humbly submit that the administration of each school is directly accountable to the Educational Executive Committee. The said body will function as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority, operating through its president/secretary as the case may be. The Governing Body which is the apex body in the management structure functions as Appellate authority, over the decisions of the Educational Executive Committee.
12. I humbly submit that the educational agency has a Grievance

Committee, to deal with the common complaints arising from the institutions, the staff, the students and the parents. There is also an Internal Complaints Committee that functions under the provisions of a Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplaces (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and under the POCSO Act 2012, depending on the nature of the complaint. The management has other sub-committees, for the welfare of the students and the staff etc., at the institutional level and at the corporate level. In every institution, there is a Parent Teacher Association and an Academic Council to coordinate and enhance the administration.

13. I humbly submit that all the schools under the petitioner have the same Service Conditions, appropriate for the teaching and non-teaching staff and are governed by a well defined Code of Conduct, stipulated by the management, in accordance with the statutory laws that are in force. There is a Common Seniority List maintained by the educational agency according to different cadres of employment from among all the schools. All the schools are considered as “a single unit” for the purpose of administration and transfer. Whenever there is a transfer of an employee, their seniority and other service benefits are protected. The transfers are kept to a minimum and only for the welfare of the staff or for administrative exigencies. In respect of the said Service Conditions and Code of Conduct, there is an Agreement entered into between the management and the employee, during the time of appointment.
14. I humbly submit that there is an Employment Bureau in the above said Congregation that maintains a registry of those Catholics, who seek for employment in the petitioner management. There is an employment policy, which governs all the appointments in the schools of the petitioner. The Catholic unemployed are given priority in employment opportunities.

However the right of selection and appointment is fully vested with the

Educational Executive Committee. The functions of the  Educational Executive Committee is discharged by its President/Secretary as the case may be.  There is total transparency in the selection and appointment of the teaching and the non-teaching staff, in the administration of the petitioner management. However, there is a preference for the staff who are working in management posts, though it is not the sole consideration, to fill up the sanctioned posts. Merits and the ethical background of the staff will be considered along with their service in the management posts.

15. I humbly submit that the petitioner, which is the official organ in the Catholic Church, has invested invaluable material and human resources in establishing the said schools under the said management down the decades. The said schools were established at various periods by progressive and philanthropic missionaries. The valuable resources of lands, buildings, infrastructure, movables and immovables, invested on the building-up of the said schools, belong to the Catholic Christian Community. None of the resources belong to any particular individual. All the resources and investments are owned by the Congregation and the Catholic community. The Catholic community, that has been spearheading the cause of education for centuries in India, has greatly contributed by way of material and financial resources and had mobilized them from the Church and Christian donors in India and abroad. The said resources of the management, mobilized for years by the community, are common for all the schools and educational institutions and are held in trust by the petitioner and are profusely used in common, by a healthy and beneficial interaction and exchange for the management, among and for all the schools. Any restriction of its usage for one particular school is not known to the petitioner management, as the resources originate from a common source, the Congregation and the Catholic Community.
16. I humbly submit that the petitioner is a body not owned by any individual, but by the community. For administrative convenience, all the properties and resources are drawn from the common sources and are owned in common by the petitioner. Apart from the material resources invested by Catholic Christian community and the said congregation, the petitioner has a comfortable financial viability, by way of deposits in various forms. This financial cushioning by the Congregation and the Church serves as an economic guarantee for the smooth financial administration of the petitioner and all the schools. The properties of the Church, especially the lands, are earmarked and are kept at the disposal of the schools of the petitioner. The petitioner takes responsibility for the smooth running of all the schools. It has a duty to guarantee the financial viability of administration, especially because of its foundational contribution from the Church and the Catholic Community. The management deploys the resources and finance in the manner that is most beneficial to the petitioner, collectively for all the schools.
17. I humbly submit that the Government of Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974), hereinafter referred to as “the Act” and framed Rules therein, called Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974, hereinafter called “the Rules”. The Act and the Rules received the assent of

the President on 20.06.1974 and were published in the Tamil Nadu

Government Gazette, Extraordinary, on 24.06.1974. The said Act and the Rules came into force on 01.12.1974. The object of the said Act and the Rules was to regulate by legislation, the establishment and running of recognized private schools and training institutes in the State of Tamil Nadu. Though the objects of the said Act and the Rules had sublime objectives, they substantially violated Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India, infringing into the rights of the minorities of religion and language to establish and administer, educational institutions of their choice. Thus, many provisions of the said Act and the Rules thereunder, were ultra vires to Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India.

18. I humbly submit that after the said Act and the Rules came into force, two batches of writ petitions came to be filed by the minority educational institutions, challenging certain provisions of the same, as inapplicable to minority schools. This Hon’ble Court by order dated 17.12.1975 and 24.09.1976 and made in W.P. Nos. 4478 of 1974 and 295/1975 respectively, declared the following provisions as inapplicable to the minority schools covered under the said Act and the Rules:

“To sum up, we declare as inapplicable to minority institutions sections 8(1)(a), 11(1) (b), 12(1), 14 to 18, 21(2) to 26, 31to 33, 39(4), 41 to 45 and Rules 7, 9 except clauses (e) and (k) rule 2,

Rules 10to 14, 16 to 18 and 22 to 24.”

The petitioner was further declared as a minority educational agency by this Hon’ble High Court in its order, dated 24. 09.1976, in the above said batch and made in W.P. 4478 of 1974. Subsequently the same declaration was acted upon by the Government by its Letter No. 5/559/RD2/76-14 dated

21. 1976, and vide Proceedings of the Director of School Education in RC No 24541- G.3/76 dated 20.11.1976.
    19. I humbly submit that after certain provisions of the Act and the

Rules were declared inapplicable to the minority schools by this Hon’ble Court, the Government introduced the Tamil Nadu Minority Schools (Recognition and Payment of Grant) Rules, 1977, enforcing the same retrospectively w.e.f. 01.12.1974. These special provisions for minority schools supplemented the provisions of the Act and the Rules that were declared inapplicable, in order to meet the requirements of regulation in respect of minority schools. The said Rules, introduced in 1977 are still applicable to the minority schools.

20. I humbly submit that after the judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 17.12.1975 and 24.09.1976 and made in W.P.No.4478/1974 and W.P. 295/1975 respectively, the Government preferred Special Leave Petition and it was admitted as Civil Appeals Nos. 1521-56 and 3042-91/ 1979 with SLP (C) Nos. 9833, 11242-43/86, 12408/85 and 863/80. No order of stay was granted by the Apex Court against the order of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the above batch of Appeals. The said Appeals were referred to a larger Bench by order dated 22.07.1987. Thereafter, it was clubbed along with W.P. (Civil) No. 317 of 1973, M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of

Karnataka and was referred to a still larger Bench of 11 Hon’ble Judges by Reference dated 06.02.1997.

21. I humbly submit that while in the meantime, during the pendency of the above Civil Appeals before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the following 8 Amendments were introduced by the Government into the said Act, which were integrated into the body of the provisions therein.
    1. Tamil Nadu Act 6 of 1980
    2. Tamil Nadu Act 48 of 1982

• Tamil Nadu Act 50 of 1986 iv. Adaptation of Laws Order, 1987

1. Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1987
2. Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1987

• Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1995
• Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1999

 

This petitioner, along with many other minority educational agencies, challenged one of the above said Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 48 of 1982, wherein Sections 18A and 18B were introduced into the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973. This Hon’ble Court was pleased to quash the same in respect of minority Schools, by its order, dated 12.08.1991, and made in a batch of writ petitions in W.P. No. 570/1983. The

Government preferred Appeals against the said order in CA. No. 39023945/1996. By order, dated 12/12/2002, the said Civil Appeals were also posted along with the CA. Nos. 1521-1556/1979, pertaining to the main appeal against the order concerning the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private

Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and the Rules, 1974.

22. I humbly submit that thereafter the writ petitions, concerning the parent impugned Act and the Rules and the impugned Tamil Nadu

Amendment Act 48 of, 1982, were all remanded back to this Hon’ble Court, by the Hon’ble Apex Court, by its order, dated 01-04-2003, as reported in (2003) 6 SCC 790. Ordering status quo of the position in respect of the minority institutions, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to direct this Hon’ble Court to re-examine the matters in the light of the decision of the

Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case

as reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481.

23. I humbly submit that the said case was decided by this Hon’ble Court by its order dated 10.10.2012 and made in W.P.No. 4478 of 1974. The

Hon’ble Division Bench ordered as follows:

“When the matter came up for hearing to-day, the learned Advocate General filed an affidavit sworn to by the third respondent, viz., The Joint Director of School Education (Secondary), wherein in paras 12 and 13 it is stated as follows:-

 “12. An announcement has been made to form one Common comprehensive Act to govern all the private schools, in the light of the Uniform System of School Education Act, 2010 introduced by the State Government and Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 introduced by the Central Government.

13. It is submitted that it is a matter of time, before the present law is replaced with a new one. The position that is being followed for the last 37 years, that is non-applicability of certain provisions of the said Act and the Rules, 1974 to the Writ Petitioners in SLP (CIVIL) Nos.

1521-56 and 3042-91 of 1979 by virtue of the order of the Hon’ble

Court dated 17.12.1975 shall be retain for the present.” 

4. By filling the aforesaid affidavit, the learned Advocate General submitted that the writ petitions may be disposed of with a direction to maintain status quo of the position that prevailed as on the date of the earlier judgment dated 17.12.1975 till the new comprehensive Act coming into force.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has no objection for the writ petitions being disposed of in the light of the averments made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.
6. In view of the above, the writ petitions and the Review Application are disposed of with a direction to the respondents to maintain status quo as on the date of the earlier judgment of this Court dated 17.12.1975, till the new comprehensive Act comes into force in this regard.”

However the batch of cases challenging sections 18 A and 18 B in Act

48/1982 are not yet posted for hearing, after it had been remanded to this

Hon’ble Court.

24. I humbly submit that pursuant to the same, the Tamil Nadu

Government has enacted Act, 35 of 2019, to govern the private schools in

Tamil Nadu, replacing the erstwhile Act 29 of 1974.  It received the Presidential Assent on 07.08.2019.  However it was not immediately enforced, as the Rules were not framed.  After 4 years, the Tamil Nadu

Government has framed the Rules and notified the same in the  Government Gazette, vide G.O.No.14, School Education on 13^th of January, 2023.  Thus the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 2018 and the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 2023, framed u/s 57 of the Act came to be enforced w.e.f. 13.01.2023.  The said Act, its provisions and the corresponding Rules, in effect, indicates a regime change under education law in Tamil Nadu after 50 years. As some of the provisions of the Act 35/2019 and the Rules, 2023 are offending the Constitutional guarantees under Art.30(1), the above writ petition is filed, challenging the same.

25. I humbly submit that, the following definitions in Tamil Nadu

Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 2018 and the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 2023 are relevant to decide the case on hand and therefore are extracted here below:

Sec. 2. Definitions

• “affiliation” means formal enrolment of a school with the respective Board of Examination for the purpose of following approved courses of studies and for preparing students according to the approved courses for the examinations;
• “aided school” means a school receiving any aid as grant out of the State funds to meet its expenses;
• “The Code of Conduct” means the code of conduct formulated by the Government;
• “competent authority” means any authority, officer or person authorized by the Government to perform the functions and discharge the duties of the competent authority under this Act for such area, for such purposes or in relation to such classes of private schools, as may be prescribed;

(h) “educational agency” means a Company registered under section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 or a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act,1975 or a Trust created under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 which has established or proposes to establish a private school;

• “grant” means any sum of money paid as aid out of the State funds to any private schools;
• “minority school” means a private school of its choice established and administered by any such minority whether basedon religion or language as has the right to do so under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution and so declared by the State Government orby the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions;

(m) “private school” means a Play School, Nursery and Primary, Primary, Middle, High and Higher Secondary School or Teacher Training Institute imparting education and training, whether receiving grant from the Government or not, established and administered or maintained by an educational agency and recognized by the competent authority under this Act, but does not include a school or an institution, funds to any private school;

(o) “recognised school” means a private school recognised by the competent authority under this Act;

(r) “secretary” means the secretary referred to in section 14;

Rule 2( f) “Competent Authority” means the competent authority as specified in Annexure I-A in respect of aided schools and Annexure I-B in respect of self financing schools or as may be specified by the Government from time to time;

26. I humbly submit that by the above definitions, the petitioner is an Educational Agency, as defined u/s 2(h) of the Act, a Society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. The schools of the petitioner are covered u/s 2(c) in respect of aided schools and u/s 1(3) in respect of all private schools whether aided or unaided.  The schools of the petitioner fall under the category of religious Minority Schools u/s 2(k), being Christian minority schools.  All the schools under the Educational Agency of the petitioner, as referred in para 3, are private schools u/s 2(m) of the Act.  All the institutions under the aegis of the petitioner are recognized schools, u/s 2(o), as recognized by the competent authority under 2(f) of the Act and the Rules.
27. I humbly submit that Section 4 stipulates that no private school can be established without prior permission, in writing of the competent authority. Section 57(2)(e) empowers the Government to make rules in this regard. The application for permission, u/s 5 r/w Rule 5, has been prescribed in Form I A. The provision, u/s 4, r/w Rule 5 and Form I A, makes it

mandatory for any school, including a minority schools, to be established only with the prior Opening Permission of the competent authority. The provision militates against the Constitutional right of the minority community, to establish an institution of their choice. In fact, based on the Constitutional right, Sec.9 of the Act 29/1974, statutorily exempted any minority school from the condition of prior permission for establishment. This Constitutional right had been encroached, without warranting change of circumstances or

legal position, under the new law.

28. I humbly submit that in a similar vein, a prior permission is

mandated    under                        the                      new                       law                        for                        the                purpose                         of

‘upgradation’or‘shifting’or‘merger’or‘bifurcation’in an existing private school U/R 5, vide Form I B, Form I C, Form I D and Form I E respectively. The Educational Agency has a Constitutional right, not only to establish an institution, but pursuant to the same, is also entitled to upgrade or shift or merger or bifurcate the said institution, without prior permission, subject to compliance of the legal requirements thereunder. Any establishment of an institution, and the subsequent up-gradation, shifting, merger or bifurcation, issubject to further approval by the authorities. The competent authorities are well within their right, to verify the compliance of conditions, before granting approval or refusing the same.  Therefore prior permission is redundant and

arbitrary in this regard.

29. I humbly submit that the legal requirement, under Form I C, in respect of ‘shifting’ a school, Form I D, in respect of ‘merger’ of schools, Form I E, in respect of ‘bifurcation’ of the existing school, makes it mandatory to obtain the ‘consent of the parents’, for doing so. The said consent of the parents are not only unwarranted, but is an encroachment into the right of the minority community and the Educational Agency, to establish and administer, the educational institutions of their choice. The Constitutional right, nowhere contemplates, either a consultation or concurrence, of the parents, who are only beneficiaries of the educational institutions at a particular point of time. They have no right, either Constitutional or Statutory, to object to any development on establishment, while the minority community, through the Educational Agency has decided to exercise its Constitutional right.  Therefore, a prior permission u/s 4 and 5 r/w rule 5, vide Form I A and Form I B, and the consent of the parents, vide Form I C, Form I D and Form I E, will be an infraction into the right of the minority

community, as enshrined in Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

30. I humbly submit that similarly, for opening an ‘additional section’ or to introduce an ‘additional medium’, U/R 13 r/w Form I F, the Educational Agency requires prior permission. The minority community and its Educational Agency is entitled to expand its establishment in accordance with law and the said right cannot be abridged or curtailed by way of discretionary and executive prohibitions. However, the legal compliance can be verified by the competent authority, while they grant recognition, after the opening of additional sections and introduction of additional medium.  In the teeth of Sec. 37 of the Act, where there is an embargo upon providing Grantin–Aid for any class, course or medium, opened after the academic year 1991-

92, the said prior permission for ‘additional section’ or ‘additional medium’ stand unwarranted in respect of minority institutions. For the purpose of

clarity, it is submitted that the right of establishment also includes the right of expansion by way of additional section or additional medium of an existing institution. Therefore, Rule13, referrable to Form I F, is ultra virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

31. I humbly submit that Sec. 7 provides for applying for a

“Certificate of Recognition” within a period of 3 years from the date of opening of the school.  While applying for the same under Form II A U/R 8, an inspection is contemplated by the competent authorities U/S 8(1).  In the process of inspection U/S 8(2), certain conditions are to be satisfied.  In this regard, sec. 8(2)(b) stipulates that the competent authority has to consider

“the need of the private school in the locality.” This condition to satisfy the authorities on the need of the school is highly unconstitutional in the context of the Constitutional right of a minority community to establish a school of its choice.  Thus, Section 8(2)(b) encroaches upon the right of the minority schools, guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

32. I humbly submit that the conditions of recognition prescribed U/R 8, has stipulated creation of an ‘Endowment’ in the name of the school by

way of a fixed deposit in any Nationalized Bank or in a Government

authorized agency for a period of not less than seven years, for an amount as

specified hereunder:

The Table

Sl. No. Category of School                                                                         Amount (in Rupees)

(1)                     (2)                                                         (3)

• Play School     Fifty thousand only
• Nursery and Primary School One lakh only
• Primary School     One lakh only
• Middle School     Two lakh only
• High School     Two lakh and fifty thousand only
• Higher Secondary School   Three lakh only

 

Provided that in respect of a private school in existence on the date of publication of these rules in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette the endowment shall be created within a

period of six months from the said date;

The said creation of Endowment as a condition of recognition has been already held to be ultra-virus by the Hon’ble Division Bench. Most of the schools of the petitioner were established in the last century or even before. This Hon’ble Court categorically held in its order, dated 17.12.1975, in

W.P.No.4478 of 1974, that in the context of Corporate Educational Agency, running thousands of schools, it will be a stringent condition to require creation of Endowment, imposing a burden in respect of every institution, when the minority Educational Agency itself has a well-oiled and time tested financial stability for centuries.  The said condition also stipulates, in Proviso to 6 (f), that the said Endowment shall be created within a time-frame of 6 months from the date of enforcement of the impugned law, in respect of the private schools already in existence. This provision u/r 8(6)(f) is ultra-vires of Art.30(1) and violates more than one decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench.

33. I humbly submit that there is a similar provision u/r 8(6)(g) to create a deposit in any Nationalized Bank for a sum equivalent to one month’s salary of the staff, as a ‘Cash Reserve Fund’ for a particular school, for the purpose of disbursement of salary for the staff on the due date without any hassle. The said condition, for creation for ‘Cash Reserve Fund’ for every school has been held to be not a good law, by this Hon’ble Court as it will be an unwarranted financial burden on  the minority institution, crippling the administration. The Hon’ble Division Bench held that there is no necessity by way of any regulation to demand the minority institution to deposit an amount equivalent to a minimum of one month salary of the staff in every school, as the salary is paid by the Government through Grant-in-Aid. As of now the

salary is paid by ECS, directly to the Bank Account of the staff. In this regard,

both the creation of Endowment within 6 months and creation of Cash

Reserve Fund have been held to be unconstitutional in respect of minority educational institutions in the various decisions of the Division Bench. The said law will burden the age-old minority institutions to mobilize exorbitant amounts suddenly. It will be an unreasonable burden on the petitioner. Thus, the said provision u/r 8(6)(g) is against the right of administration enshrined

in Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

34. I humbly submit that yet another condition stipulated for upgradation, vide Form I B for shifting, under Form I C for merger, under Form I D and for bifurcation under Form I E, u/r 5, state that the approval of the building has to be obtained from the Directorate of Town and Country Planning (DTCP) or Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA)

or Local Planning Authority (LPA).  This condition runs against the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench, that such approval will be an unreasonable burden, in respect of the buildings that have been certified by the competent authority, such as Panchayat, Municipality or Corporation, under the law that was applicable as on the date of completion of the building, before 2011. A similar condition has been also imposed for renewal in Form II B U/R 9(1). The said condition in respect of the buildings, already certified by the competent authority, is highly redundant and is an unreasonable burden on the schools of the petitioner. Therefore the condition for DTCP approval, u/r 5, vide Entry 12 in Form I B, Entry 12 in Form I C, Entry 13 in Form I D, Entry 11 in Form I E and Entry 8 in Form II B, is against the settled legal position.

35. I humbly submit that the conditions of recognition are made applicable, ‘mutatis mutandis’, for renewal, r/w Rule 9(1) and (4), and further stipulated under Form II B. Therefore, the offending conditions in respect of recognition are pari-materia in respect of conditions for renewal. Thus, the above referred impugned conditions of recognition are equally violative, also in respect of the provisions for Renewal, u/r 9(1) and9(4) and are violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.
36. I humbly submit that further conditions for recognition,

stipulated in Entries 2 (iii) and 2 (vi) of Form III A u/r 8 (7) and in Form III B u/r 9(1), state that “the Educational Agency shall abide by all the orders and instructions issued by the authorities concerned from time to time.”  In this regard, there cannot be an unguided power vested upon the competent authority to issue directions that are unconnected with the academic excellence, and educational standards. Such directions will impinge upon the right of minority institutions for administration, based on Constitutional rights. They cannot be imposed upon the minority institutions, as it would be amounting to unreasonable restrictions, as held by the Hon’ble Division

Bench, in respect of Act 29 of 1974. Therefore, the provisions u/r 8(7) and  9(1), vide Entries in 2(iii) and 2(vi) of Form III A and in Form III B are ultra virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

37. I humbly submit that U/S 13 r/w Rule 37, whenever there is change in the constitution of the educational agency or amendment to Byelaws or Memorandum of Association, the educational agency has to submit the details, within 15 days from the date of registration. The minority Educational Agency is liable to undergo reconstitution of Governing Body periodically, due to Canonical reasons and change of leadership or transfer. However, the change of the persons will not alter the minority character of the educational agency, as it is exclusive only to Christian religious members, such as Nuns or Priests. No non-Christian can be inducted into the

constitution of the Christian Educational Agency. Similarly, the amendments to the Bye-laws and Memorandum of Association are necessary for various reasons, due to involvement of the society in multiple charitable activities. Such a change may not have any bearing over the minority character of the educational Administration. Therefore, a mandatory  report of all changes to educational authorities u/s 13 r/w Rule 37, is an unreasonable restriction and

ultra virus the Constitution under Art. 30(1).

38. I humbly submit that similarly, Sec. 13(1)(b) r/w Rule. 37(2) vide Form V mandates a prior permission for transferring the management of the school to another Educational Agency. The petitioner, being a Corporate Educational Agency from the Catholic Christian denomination, such a

transfer within the Catholic Educational Agencies or religious congregations or dioceses, is part of its right to establish and administer educational institutions. Any provision to accord approval after the transfer is sufficient. The educational authorities cannot decide the same by way of prior approval. Such a prior permission, u/s 13(1)(b) r/w Rule. 37(2), encroaches upon the right of establishment of minority schools, guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

39. I humbly submit that the special provision for minority schools in Sec.16, states that the minority educational agency will have a right to establish and administer private schools, “primarily for the benefit of such minorities”. The said provision u/s 16(1) seeks to qualify the constitutional right to establish and administer institutions of their choice, under Art. 30(1) of the constitution. While the founding fathers of the constitution have provided a right to “establish institutions of their choice”, the said open- ended constitutional right cannot be further qualified or restricted, by introducing the words like “primarily for the benefit of such minorities.” The said interpolation, u/s 16(1) into the constitutional scheme falls foul of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution.
40. I humbly submit that the condition to retain the minority status, u/s 17, when a private minority school is transferred to another Educational Agency of the same minority, only with prior approval is preposterous, in so far as the approval is only procedural and cannot be a condition for the retainment of minority status. The provision directly contravenes the ratio laid down in Ammad case, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The prior approval or post-approval cannot decide or alter the substantial minority character of

institutions. Thus, Section 17 is ultra virus Art. 30(1) of the Constitution

41. I humbly submit that the provision u/s 18, 31 and 56(2) r/w Rule 27, empower the Government/Authorities to appoint a Special Officer to administer the minority school, after suspending the management of the minority school. The said Special Officer will discharge the functions of the management. On the appointment of the special officer, the concerned DEO will be the drawing and disbursing officer for the pay and allowance of the staff. Sec.18 further mandates that in respect of minority schools, such a special officer has to be appointed from the same minority community. The cumulative effect of said provisions are highly unconstitutional as the constitutional right of administration cannot be deprived to a minority institutions and entrusted to a third party executive officer. Appointing a Christian officer will not cure the unconstitutional interference into the protected administration of minority school under Art.30(1). A similar provision u/s. 18A of the erstwhile Act, has been struck down by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in respect of Minority Schools. While deciding the question of appointing a special officer, the competent authority is directed to consider whether the provisions of the impugned Act and the Rules have been strictly followed. As stated above, the provisions, the Rules or the Orders in so far as they are incompatible with Art. 30(1) of the constitution, cannot be an indicia to decide the ground for suspending the management or appointing a Special Officer. That apart, under Sec. 31(2), the competent authority is empowered to resort to direct payment, pending consideration of the Government to appoint a Special Officer. It is an

encroachment into the minority administration.

42. I humbly submit that the Explanation to Sec.31(3), empowers the Special Officer to manage the minority school “in accordance with any law applicable to the private schools”, including Bye-laws, Rules, Regulations or Such a carte-blanche power to the Special Officer militate

against the character of a minority institutions, that is established to reflect and preserve the culture and philosophy of a minority community. That will be a derailment of the vision of the founding fathers of the minority

institution. Thus, the provisions U/S 18, 31 and 56(2), r/w Rule 27, regarding

the suspension of the management, direct payment and appointing of a Special Officer will amount to gross violation of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

43. I humbly submit that regarding ‘admissions’, of the school, done under Rule 17(1), the admission process is sought to be governed by the instructions and guidelines issued by the Government or the Director. The minority school has no quarrels in following the general norms, regarding the age criteria, the rationalization of fee, issuance of certificates etc., as the admission process has to satisfy the legal parameters. However, there is no rhyme or reason in Rule 21(9)(a), as to why there is an embargo upon commencing the process of admission either before the release of the results and that it has to be approved by the competent authorities. Similarly, Rule 21(9)(g) restricts the liberty of a minority school, even in respect of conducting the internal examination and directs the school to conduct the same only under the guidelines of the competent authority. Thus, Rule 17(1) tampers with the right of admission of the minority institution, which is in contravention of the ratio laid down by the constitutional courts of the country. Similarly, Rule 21(9)(a) and 21(9)(g) regarding examinations are illegal restrictions over the constitutional right of the minority institutions. Therefore, Rules 17(1), 21(9)(a) and 21(9)(g) are violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.
44. I humbly submit that Sec.24 r/w Rule 41 provide for Parent Teacher Association, for the purpose of participation of the parents in improving quality of education and learning environment. However, rule 41B (3) states that the PTA is empowered to initiate action, against the delinquent in the school premises, or in the school transport, in the context of POCSO offences, while the management fails to report the same. This provision empowers the PTA to interfere into the area of ‘disciplinary control, disciplinary proceedings, and disciplinary action, in a minority school. The

PTA cannot become a substitute for the disciplinary authority of the minority management. Such interference by PTA into a minority administration will be an encroachment into the right of administration as contemplated under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. The said provision vide Rule 41B (3) will be

ultra virus of Art.30(1) of the Constitution.

45. I humbly submit that Sec. 26 prohibits collection of any fee by the school, except the fee determined by the Fee Determination Committee under Act 22 of 2009. However, the Tamil Nadu Schools (Regulation of Collection of Fee) Act, 2009 is not applicable to Aided schools as referable to section 2(j) of the Act. The said law will apply only to self-financing schools. But, while Sec. 26 is silent on the financial administration of aided schools, in respect of non-salary expenditure, it seeks to control any fee collection, as may be specified by the Government. This provision, read in consonance with Annexure-VI, prescribed under Rule 33(3), is highly unreasonable, because the aided schools have been totally deprived of Maintenance Grant, under the law. The Rules and the Government Orders are totally silent over the financial challenges arising from the maintenance and administration, in respect of aided High Schools and Higher Secondary Schools. For that reason, Sec.26 r/w Rule 33(2)(a) has no nexus with the object of the Act and violates the Tamil Nadu Schools (Regulation of Collection of Fee) Act, 2009.
46. I humbly submit that Sec.27 r/w Rule 35 deal with utilization of funds and properties of the private schools. The minority institutions have no quarrel regarding transparency and accountability in financial matters, including collection of fee and utilization of funds. However, the financial autonomy cannot be restricted by an executive action, wherein unguided

powers are vested with the authorities. The minority institution is well within its right, to utilize its own funds for the purposes in furtherance of education and its specific cultural activities, under Art. 29 and 30 of the Constitution. Any unreasonable restriction in this regard will be ultra-vires of Art. 30(1)A of the Constitution. Similar provisions u/s 32 r/w Rule 23 and 24 of the erstwhile Act, 1973, have been struck-down in respect of minority schools. In spite of that, the impugned Act and the Rules thereunder have repeated the same. Similarly, u/r 35(2), a prior permission is mandated, when the educational agency seeks to use the funds even within the educational administration. The minority community, which has invested incalculable material and financial resources, in establishing and administering educational institutions, is entitled to deploy its resources in accordance with the requirements of the institutions. It is only subject to conditions relating to prohibition of profiteering and capitation fee, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Within the said parameters, the minority institution is at liberty, to use its resources for educational purposes and the related cultural purposes for that matter. This legal position has been accepted by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the ratio laid-down in Lakshmi Matriculation School case. Under the guise of monitoring, the utilization of funds, the authorities cannot interfere into the financial autonomy that is subject only to the norms of transparency and accountability, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Modern School Case. Therefore, Sec.27 r/w Rule 35(2) will be ultra virus of the Art. 30(1) of

the Constitution.

47. I humbly submit that Sec.30 r/w Rule 40 mandates a prior

permission in writing for transferring the property of a private school. The provision under Sec. 30(3)(b) also empowers the competent authority to

impose conditions, as it deems fit, for transferring the property. Section 30(4) states that in such transaction will be null and void, if it is without prior

permission.

48. I humbly submit that Rule 40(2) further states that the movable properties of a private minority school will be sold, only by a public auction and the proceeds of the same will have to be credited in to the Account of the school. These provisions have no nexus with the object of the Act. As stated supra, the properties of a minority school are not vested in any individual.  The properties are vested in the Catholic Community and the corporate entity, rather than on an individual institution. It is centrally invested, controlled and deployed for the purposes under law.  Restricting the control to a particular institution will be amounting to unreasonable abridgment of the right of the Corporate Minority Educational Agency. The prior permission from a competent authority and the mode of disposal by public auction have no reasonableness or justification, while the Government has no role in creating or maintaining these assets at any point of time. The said provisions, U/S 30 r/w Rule 40, are highly preposterous and ultra virus of the Constitutional

right, enshrined in Art.30(1) and 30(1)A of the Constitution.

49. I humbly submit that regarding the appointments and conditions of service of the staff in Chapter – VII, the minority schools are entitled to select and appoint eligible and qualified persons in the teaching and non teaching posts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the minority institution can evolve and follow a reasonable procedure to be followed in their institutions, without contravening the provisions of the statutes. While being so, the impugned Act U/S 32(5), and 35(1) r/w Rule 28(7), vide Form VI A and Form VI B, have mandated a common set of

conditions of service, irrespective of the character of the institutions.  Thus,

they have usurped the right of appointment, which is part of right of

administration by stipulating service conditions to the minority institutions.

Form VI A U/R 28(7) prescribes Service Conditions for the permanent staff. It deals with the matters relating to probation, availing medical leave, involving in trade or business, conducting private tuition, disciplinary control and imposing punishment, the rules for resignation, the rules of appeal, the

pay and allowances and increment, etc. Rules 28(16) imposes on the obligation of the management to abide by the direction of the authorities and28(17) stipulates the condition, on retirement and reemployment. Thus, the impugned provisions have totally usurped the terms and conditions of appointment and service, leaving no space for the administration of the minority schools. This is in gross violation of the ratio laid down by the Constitutional courts. On the other hand, the Government can stipulate only the basic service conditions, for legal compliance and ought to leave the daytoday administration of the staff, to be adopted by the minority institutions. Therefore, Section 32(5), 35(1), r/w Rules 28(7), 28(16) and 28(17), vide Form VI A and VI B, are violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.

50. I humbly submit that the mode of selection of the staff, stipulated u/s 32(1) r/w 28(2) and (5),vide Annexure V, regarding teaching and non teaching staff, have mandated the appointments to be made through

deployment from any other private aided school or if it is not possible, by promotion from among the qualified teachers in that school, based on merit and ability and seniority being considered only when merit and ability are approximately equal and if it is  not possible, to appoint from among the qualified non teaching staff and even if that is not possible to appoint by direct recruitment. Such an order of priority of appointment by deployment or by promotion from the teaching staff or by promotion from the non-teaching staff or lastly by direct recruitment cannot be imposed upon a minority

institution. It is totally depriving the right of selection and appointment of any

qualified person of their choice. The right of selection and appointment cannot be restricted by a statute, prescribing a rigid order of priority and feeder category, in respect of minority school, as held by this Hon’ble Court in Eka Ratchagar case. The entire statute u/s 32(1), r/w Rule 28(2) and (5), r/w Annexure V falls foul of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The said position is already decided in many cases by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

51. I humbly submit that Rule 28(4)(a) mandates a prescription of a ‘age limit’ for direct recruitment to teaching and non-teaching posts. Such a prescription is unwarranted and does not have nexus with the merit or ability or qualification. Many teaching and non-teaching staff are already engaged in minority schools with due qualifications, in unaided posts on management service. Due to non availability of sufficient aided posts, they are working as management staff for years with legitimate expectation, to be accommodated

in aided posts, as an when they arise. It is not their fault or option that they are

not appointed in an aided posts, within a particular age. Therefore,

prescription of age limit for appointment, especially for minority schools is highly illegal. That apart, constituting the age limit as part of the qualification, has no nexus with the object of the Act. Therefore, the process of selection and appointment of staff in minority schools, u/r 28(4)(a), cannot be tampered with, by the impugned legislation and is in violation of Art. 30(1) of the

Constitution.

52. I humbly submit that Section 35(2) prescribes mandatory prior permission of the competent authority for commencing the process of

recruitment of the teaching and non-teaching staff in any aided school. When the minority institution is entitled to select and appoint the qualified person of its choice, it is trite law that the Government can only prescribe qualification and cannot interfere with the mode of selection and appointment. But even before the appointment, to commence the process of the recruitment, Section 35(2) contemplates prior permission. Such a blatant abridgement of the constitutional right of minority institution in respect of selection and appointment, cannot be sustained, as held by this Hon’ble Court. Thus, section 35(2) is ultra virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

53. I humbly submit that U/R 29, the disciplinary action is contemplated against a teaching or non-teaching staff of an aided private school for violation of Code of Conduct U/R 36, as prescribed or for any other act, that constitutes unbecoming action arising from their service. In pursuance of the same, minor penalty of fine, censure, withholding increment,  pecuniary loss to the Government and major penalties of reduction in rank, compulsory retirement, removal from service and dismissal.  In the proviso to the said Rule 29, there is a prohibition clause that no other penalty can be imposed for any established charge of corruption. Further, the punishments like compulsory retirement, after attainment of age of 50 years or completing

30 years of service, discharge of staff working in temporary vacancy or termination of staff as per the agreement, are stated to be a non-penalty under the said provision. Thereafter, the provision deals with matters relating to framing charges, the nature of oral enquiry, or a full-fledged domestic enquiry, preparation of enquiry report, furnishing the enquiry report, notice in respect of proposed punishment and issuing final orders. Such sweeping powers, in the area of disciplinary control, vested with the executive, in

respect of the minority schools, is highly impermissible.

54. I humbly submit that Rule 30(5) mandates revocation of

suspension and re-instatement in the context of honorable acquittal, from criminal prosecution.  The Constitutional courts have time and again, held that there is no automatic re-instatement, arising from acquittal from the criminal cases, as they are both parallel proceedings and operate at different levels.  While in criminal cases, the prosecution is bound to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt, in the domestic enquiry, it suffices to hold a charge as proved, on the preponderance of probability.  The law of evidence and the standard of proof are different in respect of criminal cases and domestic enquiries. While facts being so, the provision of automatic revocation of suspension and re-instatement are not only unwarranted, but

also not practical in reality.

55. I humbly submit that the said provision further mandates u/r 30

(5) (b), full back-wages on acquittal from criminal cases. That question may not arise, because even without waiting, for the finality of the criminal case, the institutions can proceed independently, to conduct a Domestic Enquiry and impose punishment or reinstate in accordance with law. The criminal

cases take years for reaching a finality, and so the disciplinary proceedings or the suspension cannot be continued indefinitely. The impugned proceedings under Sec. 30(4), holds that suspension cannot be continued beyond 6 months. While being so, the criminal prosecution, which are not within the control of the institution, rarely reaches a finality before 6 months. Therefore, the said

provision on disciplinary proceedings, building a nexus with criminal prosecution is highly unreasonable and untenable. That apart, the right of disciplinary control cannot be abridged or diluted by the said impugned provision. Thus, the Rule 29 regarding disciplinary action and Rule 30, in respect of suspension, are a flagrant violation of the right under Art. 30(1) of

the Constitution.

56. I humbly submit that in a similar vein, the procedure for suspension, on a charge of misconduct, and the mode of enquiry on grave charges, the action to be taken during criminal complaints and investigation, the mode of deemed suspension arising from detention, the communication of suspension to the educational authorities for due approval, payment of subsistence allowance, the maximum period of suspension are provided for U/R 30. Rule 30(5) further elaborates on the honorable acquittal in a criminal prosecution, mandating revocation of suspension, re-instatement of the staff and payment of full back-wages etc.,  Such a detailed legal frame cannot be sustained in respect of minority schools.  As such, disciplinary control is one of the cardinal rights of the minority institutions.  The minority institution is well within its rights to frame charges, conduct an enquiry in accordance with the basic principles of domestic enquiry, after affording opportunity to the delinquent and is also entitled to impose a proportionate punishment, in accordance with law. The nuances of charges, the mode of enquiry, the mode of punishment, provision for appeal within the Corporate Management, the payment of subsistence allowance, suspension and revocation, and other details have to be left to the minority management.  On the other hand, the said provision u/r 29, 30(2) and 30(5) have totally usurped the right of disciplinary control and disciplinary proceeding and disciplinary action,

depriving the minority institution of its valuable right under Art. 30(1).

57. I humbly submit that Sec.34 r/w Rule 36 contemplates

prescription of Code of Conduct, to be formulated by the Government. As stated supra, the prescription of Code of Conduct is to be vested with the minority institution and not to be the burden of the Government. That will be an infraction into the right of administration. That apart, U/R 36(2), the details of Code of Conduct are listed, without even leaving any space to be further stipulated by the minority school. The constitutional courts have, time and again, held that the minority institution is well within its right to stipulate its Code of Conduct, as part of the right of administration and enforce the same and initiate appropriate action, whenever there is a breach of the Code of

Conduct. In this regard, the Hon’ble Division Bench, has held ultra-vires Sec. 21 r/w Rule 16under erstwhile Act of 1975, in respect of minority schools. While there is no change of any legal position, the impugned Act seeks to deprive this precious right of disciplinary control, in respect of minority institutions. Thus, Sec. 34 r/w Rule 36, are in violation of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

58. I humbly submit that Sec.38 provides for the surplus teacher to be appointed by the Government, in any school, including Government school or private school. Rule 32 has laid down norms for staff-fixation and

deployment of the surplus staff. Rule 32 states that the staff-fixation will be done based on the posts sanctioned, as on 1991-1992 or based on the stafffixed as on the 1^st August of every academic year, and whichever is less. The said Rule 32, r/w Sec.37, regarding prohibition of payment of grant to new private school, class or course or medium of instruction, makes it clear that there is an embargo upon providing grant to new schools or to any addition to the aided schools. However, Rule 32 A (3), instead of sustaining the embargo for additional grant, is attempting to steadily reduce the grant and expand the scope of the embargo. Otherwise, there is no other reason for reducing the staff, comparing with the staff sanctioned as on 1991-1992.

59. I humbly submit that the student strength in an aided school is never static. While the Government many have reasons not to commit to additional expenditure, it has no reason to reduce expenditure, even though there is increase of strength in needy aided schools. It is in gross violation of the provisions under the Right to Education Act, 2009. Thus, the Government is applying Sec.37, retrospectively, vide Rule 32A (3), to reduce the posts and resume the same to the common pool. Applying the benchmark of 1991-1992 and to the  increase of present strength and the available posts within the Grant-in-Aid scheme, surplus posts from one school have to be permitted to be absorbed in another needy aided school within the Corporate Management, as per the Division Bench order. But the impugned provision is applied only in the negative, rather than in the positive, to reduce the posts and not to avail the same while there are needy schools within the Grant-in-Aid scheme. This is in violation of the spirit of the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, dated 31.03.2021, in W.A.(MD). No. 76 of 2019.
60. I humbly submit that the provision, not permitting the Corporate Management in moving the surplus staff to the increased strength of the needy aided schools, but only permitting the reduction of the staff strength is against the object of the Right of Education Act, 2009. While the apprehension of the Government, in not providing additional posts after 1991-1992 is due to alleged financial constraints, the stand of the Government in not permitting the surplus posts to be distributed to the needy aided schools cannot be sustained. Therefore, Sec.37, 38 r/w Rule 32A (3), are ultra virus, in respect of minority institutions and are also in breach of the provisions of RTE Act, 2009.
61. I humbly submit that under Sec.38, the Government intends to appoint any teacher, who is surplus into any private school. Necessarily, the private schools also include minority schools. To that extent, the provision is making inroads into the right of selection and appointment, by the minority

management. Thus, the impugned Act, has usurped the powers of

appointment, to itself, from the minority intuition. As stated supra, the right of appointment is vested with the minority institution. The Government can only prescribe qualifications, conceding the right to appoint to the minority institution. This foundational principle is sought to be breached by the impugned provision u/s. 38 and is ultra virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. This is in violation of the order of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court.

62. I humbly submit that Rule 32 B deals with the deployment of

surplus staff. In the explanation to the said provision, the surplus staff is identified, as the junior most staff in the school. This may not apply to the Corporate Minority Management, as the Educational Agency, running more than one school, is to be considered, as ‘one unit’ for the purpose of seniority and promotion u/r 28(3). While being so, there is no reasonableness in

holding that the junior most of the school will be held surplus. Secondly, Rule 32 B (3) holds that the surplus staff can be accommodated only, in an ‘eligible vacant post’ and not in a needy school, based on increase of strength. Rule 32 B (5) stipulates the different levels for absorbing the surplus teachers, and resuming the surplus posts to the common pool or absorbing the surplus in the adjacent revenue districts or absorbing under the same education agency in a faraway district or absorbing the surplus teachers in a different educational agency. The impugned provision stipulates that the process to be done by conducting counseling U/R 32 B (6). Rule 32 B (7) deals with deputation. Rule 32 B (8) imposes a ban on any new appointment, in any school, till all the surplus are exhausted in other aided private schools, based on the report

filed by the DEO, CEO and JD.

63. I humbly submit that by all these methods of the impugned

provisions,   prior permission for appointment is indirectly  introduced, in respect of minority schools. Rule 32B (9) mandates the deployed staff to go and join duty within 15 days, at the threat of stoppage of grant. There is also a

provision U/R 32B (11) for stoppage of grant for refusal to relieve the deployed staff. In the same vein, Rule 32B (12) is introducing another prohibition of grant, in case of non-accommodation of deployed staff. In this regard, there is a ban on all the new appointments, mandating a prior approval. Such an elaborate procedure for deployment, without considering the special character of the corporate minority schools, is highly audacious.

64. I humbly submit that even if there is increase of strength in the original school of the deployed teacher, there is no possibility of returning the posts to the erstwhile school, without obtaining the willingness of the staff, under Rule 32B(13). The post is sanctioned only to the institution and nothing personal to the The entire scheme of the deployment, u/r 32B(2), (3) and (5) to (13), is highly illegal and ultra virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India.
65. I humbly submit that Sec.36 r/w Rule 33 provides for payment of grant to private schools, which have been already receiving grant as on 199192. In the explanation to the provision, it is further stated that the cut-off date for the stoppage of grant to the new schools, established after 1991-92will also apply to the new class or course or medium of instruction, commenced after 1991-92. This provision along with Sec. 37, creates a total prohibition of grant-in-aid scheme, to any private school or class or course or medium of instruction, started after the year 1991-92. G.O. (Ms) No. 148 dated 07.2018School Education Department,  has provided for the commencing of parallel English Medium in aided schools. The teachers in the Grant-in-Aid scheme, can be purposefully deployed to benefit the students. The Hon’ble Division Bench has also issued directions to deploy them to the needy

sections of the aided schools irrespective of the medium. While being so, this restriction to deprive Grant to parallel medium is highly arbitrary and in violation of the provisions of the Right to Education Act, for Free and

compulsory education in aided schools.

66. I humbly submit that, Sec. 36(2) provides for stoppage of grant, in respect of the school, that does not comply with the provisions of the Act or Rules. Similarly, Sec.36(2)(c) states that the grant can be stopped, when a school contravenes any condition that may be prescribed by the authorities. Such unguided powers, vested with the authorities, as a condition for grant-inaid, will not be in consonance with Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. Any condition that may be prescribed by the authorities, for the purpose of grantin-aid, has to satisfy the parameters of the constitutional rights, conferred under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. Secondly, Rule 33(2)(c) stipulates a condition that while filling up the post, the educational agency has to give preference to the surplus staff from other aided schools. Such a deployment, made into a minority school, from outside their management, will not only deprive the precious right of the minority school, to appoint a person of their choice, it may be in compatible with their philosophy and culture, and an

interference in the protected right under the constitution.

67. I humbly submit that the provision under Rule 33(1) that the grant-in-aid scheme will be continued, subject to the availability of funds, cannot be sustained in the teeth of Art. 21A and the provisions of RTE Act, with an object to provide free and compulsory education to the children from age of 6 to 14 years. This rigid stand to disown financial responsibility to Free

and Compulsory Education is in violation of the ratio laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramati case and Pawan Kumar case and other decisions. Therefore, Sections 36, 37, r/w rules 33(1), (2)(a) and (c), are ultra

virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

68. I humbly submit that regarding imposition of penalty u/s 40, there is an imposition of a fine of Rs. One Lakh for contravening any of the provisions of this Act and an additional fine of Rs. Ten thousand for each day of violation u/s 40(1), in respect of provisions other than Sections 8(7), 20(2), 22(3) and 22(4). The provision under Section 40(2), provides for additional penalty of imprisonment for a maximum term of one year and a fine that may extend to Rs. Five lakhs, for violation of conditions of recognition U/S 8(7); conditions to comply with the directions u/s 20(2); barring a student from sitting in a board exam U/S. 22(3) and for violating directions issued in respect of unhealthy competition U/S. 22(4). The said provision U/S. 40(1) and 40(2) is in breach of the liberty of administration as contemplated in Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. The penal provisions, u/s 40(1) and 40(2), cannot be imposed for violating conditions that are in breach of the administrative right

of minority institutions, as contemplated under Art. 30(1).

69. I humbly submit that the Chapter IX provides for Appeal and Revision U/S. 41 and 43 respectively. Section 55 also allows statutory appeal in respect of any matter to be determined finally under the provisions of the impugned Act. For this purpose, the impugned Act, U/S 2(d) r/w Rule 2(b), has contemplated a Scheme of Appellate Authority, for various purposes

under different provisions. Such prescription of appellate authority, in respect of minority schools, was already struck down by this Hon’ble Court as early as 1975. That apart, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, also contemplates the constitution of an Education Tribunal and not a statutory appeal, as held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation Case. The Constitutional rights conferred on minority institutions, regarding establishment, administration and disciplinary control, cannot be brought under the jurisdiction of the executive authorities, by way of statutory appeal and revision, contemplated U/S. 41 and 43. That apart, the approving authority in case of disciplinary action, cannot double-up, as statutory appellate authority, exercising quasijudicial powers. In this regard, the statutory appeals provided under Sec. 6(b) r/w Rule 7, in respect of opening permission and Sec. 8(5) r/w Rule 10, in respect of recognition, and the powers of appeal vested in the executive authorities, is illegal and not a good law, especially in the teeth of constitutionally protected minority institutions. Therefore, Sec.6(b) r/w Rule 7, Sec. 8(5) r/w Rule 10, Sections 41, 43 and 55, are in violation of Art. 30(1)

of the Constitution.

70. I humbly submit that section 57(2)(l) empowers the Government to stipulate conditions, subject to which donations or contributions from the public may be accepted for the private schools and the naming of the private schools. In respect of acceptance of donations to a minority school, except from the parents or students, it is required and natural, as they are all nonprofit charitable institutions. Therefore, subject to the conditions of nonprofiteering and prohibition of capitation fee, there cannot be further burdens, imposed on the minority institutions, which depend on charitable sources for its survival. Similarly, the naming of the minority school, based on its philosophy and culture, cannot be conditioned by the rule making power of the Government. Therefore, the powers conferred on the Government u/s 57(2)(l), is ultra virus of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. The provisions that were struck-down under Act 29/1974, and in utter disregard to the ratio laid down by this Hon’ble Court, have been again reintroduced, under Act 35/2019.

 

Aggrieved by the unconstitutional encroachments on the minority schools of the petitioner, as against the constitutional guarantees under Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, by the impugned provisions of the Act 2019 and the Rules 2023 and having no other alternative and effective remedy open, the petitioner begs to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this

Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a Writ of Declaration for the following among other

Grounds

540. 30 (1) of the Constitution cannot be whittled down by the act of the Legislature or by the fiat of the Executive in the name of regulations as held in para 106, 107 and 122 of the TMA Pai Foundation case and in Rev. Sidhajbhai case: AIR 1963 SC 540. The impugned Act and the rules, in many of its provisions, are in effect converting minority school in to a non-minority

private school.

1. The condition of a prior permission, to open or establish an institution, is gross violation of the constitutional guarantee, enshrined in Art.30(1) of constitution,

to the linguistic and religious minorities. While the previous Act has specifically exempted the minority schools, from obtaining prior permission,

there is no warranting reason to reintroduce the same.

1. The conditions of recognition or the conditions for receiving grant imposed on the minority schools cannot destroy the minority character of administration of

the said schools as held in para 106, 122, 141 and 142 of the TMA Pai Foundation case.

1. Creation of Endowment and creation of Cash Reserve Fund cannot be made a condition-precedent for recognition of a minority school because the minority

community has a well-entrenched economic foundation and a corporate

financial viability with community resources, in the form of the Diocese and

the religious Congregation, with enormous movable and immovable properties, vested in the petitioner as held by this Hon’ble Court in the decision reported in  (1991) WLR 419 (DB); (1999) 1 CTC 121 and (2000) II CTC 238.

1. The establishment of the minority school cannot be conditioned by the need of the locality for a new school because of the constitutional right to establish the educational institution of their choice and specifically for the welfare of the

minority community, as conferred under Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution.

1. The establishment of the minority school, including upgradation or merger or bifurcation, is a constitutional right. That cannot be abridged by consent of the

parents, as stipulated under the impugned Act and Rules thereunder.

1. The condition of DTCP approval, for the building built before 2011, had been held to be an unviable condition as held in Tamil Nadu Unaided Polytechnic

Management case: (2018) 2 WLR 293 and (2018 ) 4 CTC 129

1. The change in the constitution of educational agency or an amendment to the Memorandum or Byelaws is intrinsically related to the governance of the Church/Dioceses and the Religious Congregations, and the change of

leadership therein. There is an operation of ex-officio designatory role accrued to the leadership and therefore it cannot be constricted by a regulation for prior permission as held in Ahmadabad St. Xavier’s College Society as reported in (1974) 1 SCC 717.

1. The constitutional right provided under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India to establish and to administer the institution of their choice is open- ended and cannot be restricted or qualified, by introducing a rider that it has to be primarily for the benefit of such minorities. Such an infraction is not

contemplated under the constitutional scheme of governance.

1. The paucity of funds cannot be a plea for denying grant-in-aid for educational institutions as it is in violation of Art. 21A as held in Chandigarh Administration case: (2000) 2 SCC 42; and Manubhai Pragaji Vashias

case:(1995) 5 SCC 730.

1. Fundamental Right of the child for free and compulsory education as

enshrined in Art. 21A  cannot be violated as held in Mohini Jain case: (1992) 1 SCC 666; Unnikrishnan case: (1993) 1 SCC 645; P.A. Inamdar: (2005) 6 SCC 537; Mata Tapeshwari case: (2010) 1 SCC 639;  Pramati case: (2014) 8 SCC 271; Chandana Das case:(2020) 13 SCC 411 and Pawan Kumar Divedi case: (2014) 9 SCC 692.

1. This Hon’able Court has already held that paucity of funds, cannot be a ground for denial of grant-in-aid as held in Church of South India Case: (1988) WLR 130, the State of Tamil Nadu and four Other case: (1997) WLR 619,

C.S.I Kanyakumari Diocese case: (1999) WLR 555, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court confirmed the said Order in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 19141 and 19142 of 1998,

by order dated 16.12.1999.

10. The impugned Act and the Rules are in violation of the ratio laid down in the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in W. A. No. 24 and 28 of 1990 by order dated 10.01.1990; W.A. No. 682 0f 1996 by order dated 26. 07. 1996; W.A. No. 1040 of 1997 by order dated 11.08.1997, wherein the SLP was dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 17.08.1998 and W.A. No. 228 of 1999 by order dated 29.01.2005. This position has been further reaffirmed by the Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case as reported in  (2007) 1 MLJ 199. 
11. The provision u/s 37 of the impugned Act needs to be re-examined, in the light of the Constitutional Amendment under Art. 21A and the legal position held by this Hon’ble Court, in its order dated 31.03.2021, in W.A. (MD) No. 76 of 2019.
12. The stipulation of service conditions, including transfers is vested with the minority institution as held by this Hon’ble Court in Salem Diocese case: (2003) 4 CTC 65; Prem Kumar case (2011) WLR 38 and Sagaya Raj case: (2016) W.L.R 1101.
13. The unguided power, conferred on the executive in the context of appointment of Special Officer, is unviable, because it is left to the executive without any criteria to measure the repugnance to Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution. It militates against the right of the minority right of administration under Art. 30(1) Constitution, as held in In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case AIR 1958 SC 956 and State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial (1970) 2 SCC 417.
14. The direct payment of salary to the employees of the minority schools, usurping the right of administration, which includes the right of disbursement

of salary, is in violation of Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution.

1. While the minority management is both the appointing authority as well as the disciplinary authority, the powers of appeal cannot be conferred on the executive authorities, and is in violation of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution,

because it is part of the right to administration.

597. The quasi judicial nature of the disciplinary authority of the minority educational agency cannot be deprived as held in Mohamed Abdul Kalam case: (1999) 3 SCC 676; Kanya Junior case: (2006) 11 SCC 99 and in  a decision of this Hon’ble Court reported in (2015) WLR 597.
598. The executive authority remains the approving authority for the disciplinary action of the minority educational agency, as against a delinquent employee, and so it cannot double itself as a quasi judicial appellate authority sitting over

the same.

1. The minority educational agency’s liberty to draw from the common pool of human resource from the corporate management or from outside, for the purpose of promotion including for that of the post of Head Master, cannot be deprived in the name of regulation as held in Ammad case AIR 1999 SC 50; Malankara Syrian Catholic College case: (2007) 1 SCC 371; James Mathew Case: (2017) 15 SCC 595; Chandan Das case: (2020) 13 SCC 411 (FB) and as held by this Hon’ble Court in Eka Ratchagar case: (2008) 1 MLJ 322(DB).
2. The usurping of the right of appointment is in violation of the ratio laid down in Brahmo Samaj Education Society case (2004) 6 SCC 224 and the decision of this Hon’ble Court in 2002 WLR 538; 2003 (4) CTC 65; (2007) 4 MLJ 617 and 2010 (1) CWC 343.
3. Prior permission for appointments has been held to be in violation of Art.

30(1), in the decisions of this Hon’ble Court in Christy case (2011) 5 CTC 532; Concordia Hr.Sec.School case: (2013) WLR 691 and P.V.Ravichandran

case: (2013) 7 MLJ 641 as confirmed in SLP ( C) No. 887 of 2015.

168. In the name of retrenchment by deployment, the authorities cannot take on themselves the right to appoint teachers and other persons in the minority schools as held in para 116 and 123 in M.A Pai Foundation case, in para 17 in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society case as reported in (1974) 1 SCC 717 and para 97 in Sindhi Education Society and another case as reported in (2010) 8 SCC 49 and Queen Mary School, New Delhi case: 185 (2011) DLT 168.
169. The right of minority management, to stipulate code of conduct for its employees, cannot be substituted with, by the authorities or by the school committee as held in Para 123 and 124 in M.A Pai Foundation case and In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case AIR 1958 SC 956 and as held by this Hon’ble Court in Venkata Subba Rao Matric School case: (2000) 2 LW 445.
170. The regulation, that traverses beyond the object of academic excellence and enhancing the institution as effective educational vehicle, cannot be sustained in the face of the right to administer under Art. 30 of the Constitution, as held

in para 115 in T.M.A Pai Foundation case.

1. The power of the authorities, for monitoring and supervising the utilization of grant, cannot be used as a tool to whittle down the financial autonomy of a private school, subject only to the prohibition of profiteering and capitation fee as held in Modern School case: (2004) 5 SCC 583, in continuation of the ratio laid down in para 141 in M.A Pai Foundation case.
2. The usage of premises of the minority schools, for the welfare of the minority community, cannot be truncated in the name of regulations by the authorities, as said the institutions have to preserve and protect their culture and philosophy as held in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society case (1974) 1 SCC 717.
3. The disposal of properties of the schools by public auction is a violation of Art. 30(1)A of the Constitution, because the properties and assets are vested with the minority community or the religious body, to be used only for the benefit of its own institution, as held in para 116 in M.A Pai Foundation

case.

1. The prohibition on collection of donations from the donors in India and abroad, based on a fiduciary and religious relationship with the minority community, cannot be sustained in the wake of the right to administer, and under Art.30(1)A of the Constitution of India. The Government itself encourages donations from the public for its scheme “Namma Oru Palli” by way of private participation. That being so the Corporate management is well within its rights to mobilize resources from the public except from students and parents. The right of minority community to utilize its funds and donations can not be abridged by way of an executive order, except for ensuring the non-

profiteering nature and for prohibition of capitation fee.

1. The minority institutions, being cultural icons of the minority community, as held in para 101 of the TMA Pai Foundation case cannot be tampered with by

the statutory authorities in the name of regulating the naming of the said

institutions.

1. The minority character is in-built in the institution as held in Joseph of Cluny Case : (2018) 6 SCC 772 and as held in St. Ignatius Hr.Sec.School

Case: (1999) 1 CTC 121

1. The standard of proof and evidence and the proceedings in a criminal prosecution are different as held in Neelam Nag case: (2016) 9 SCC 499 and Ganga Raj case: (2020) 3 SCC 423 and therefore automatic reinstatement on acquittal from a criminal case is untenable.
2. I humbly submit that, it is highly illegal on the part of the respondents to introduce provisions, pari materia to the provisions which were already struck-down under the erstwhile Tamil Nadu Act 29/1974 by its order dated 17.12.1975. In this regard, all the institutions under the petitioner have been declared as minority institutions by this Hon’ble Court, as early as

1975 and which has been acted upon by the Government by its Letter No.

5/559/RD2/76-14 dated 21.10.1976, and vide Proceedings of the Director of School Education in RC No 24541- G.3/76 dated 20.11.1976. All these years, the institutions under the petitioner have been held to be minority institutions. While facts being so, the petitioner may be prejudiced,  if the respondents insist on a fresh ‘minority status  certificate’ again in respect of all the institutions under the corporate management of the petitioner under the new law. That apart,  the age old institutions under the petitioner have been already exempted by this Hon’ble Court by order dated 17.12.1975 in W.P.No.4478 of 1974, in respect of providing Endowment and Reserve Fund under the erstwhile Act. While being so, any insistence again to create an ‘Endowment” and “Cash Reserve Fund” for all the institutions under the petitioner, under the impugned Act, will financially cripple the institutions of the petitioner. Unless there is an order of interim injunction restraining the respondents from insisting on fresh minority status certificate and from creating Endowment and Cash Reserve Fund, in respect of the institutions of the petitioner, annexed in the injunction petition, the petitioner will be greatly prejudiced. Therefore, an urgent order of injunction is highly just and

essential.

72. That apart, unless this Hon’ble Court is pleased to issue an order of interim stay of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(2)(b), 8(5), 13, 16(1), 17, 18, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32(1), 32(5), 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40(1), 40(2), 41, 43, 55, 56(2), 57(2)(l) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 2018 (Tamil Nadu Act No.

35 of 2019) and the Rules 5, 7, 8(6)(f), 8(6)(g), 8(7), 9(1),  9(4), 10, 13, 17(1),

21(9)(a), 21(9)(g), 27, 28(2) 28(4)(a) 28(5) 28(7) 28(16) 28(17), 29, 30 (2),

30(5), 32A (3), 32B(2), 32B (3), 32 B (5) to 32 B (13),  33(1), 33(2)(a), 33(2)

(c), 35(2), 36, 37, 40, 41B(3) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation)

Rules, 2023,  in respect of the schools under the petitioner, as mentioned in the Annexure to the Stay Petition, the petitioner will be greatly prejudiced.

Therefore, an urgent order of interim stay is highly just and essential.

 

73. Therefore, it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order of interim stay of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(2)(b), 8(5),

13, 16(1), 17, 18, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32(1), 32(5), 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40(1), 40(2),

41, 43, 55, 56(2), 57(2)(l) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation)

Act, 2018 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 35 of 2019) and the Rules 5, 7, 8(6)(f),

8(6)(g), 8(7), 9(1),  9(4), 10, 13, 17(1), 21(9)(a), 21(9)(g), 27, 28(2) 28(4)(a) 28(5) 28(7) 28(16) 28(17), 29, 30 (2), 30(5), 32A (3), 32B(2), 32B (3), 32 B

(5) to 32 B (13),  33(1), 33(2)(a), 33(2) (c), 35(2), 36, 37, 40, 41B(3) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 2023,  in respect of the schools under the petitioner, as mentioned in the Annexure to the Stay  Petition, pending the above writ petition and thus render justice.

 

74. Therefore, it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant an order of interim injunction, restraining the respondents, from insisting on fresh minority status certificate and creating Endowment and Cash Reserve Fund, as held by this Hon’ble Court by order dated 17.12.1975 in the batch of cases in W. P. No. 4478 of 1974, in respect of the existing institutions of the petitioner, annexed in the petition for interim injunction, pending the above writ petition and thus render justice.

Therefore it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a WRIT OF DECLARATION or any other appropriate writ or order,

declaring Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(2)(b), 8(5), 13, 16(1), 17, 18, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32(1), 32(5), 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40(1), 40(2), 41, 43, 55, 56(2), 57(2)(l) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 2018 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 35 of 2019) and the Rules 5, 7, 8(6)(f), 8(6)(g), 8(7), 9(1),  9(4), 10, 13, 17(1), 21(9)(a), 21(9)(g), 27, 28(2) 28(4)(a) 28(5) 28(7) 28(16) 28(17), 29, 30 (2),

30(5), 32A (3), 32B(2), 32B (3), 32 B (5) to 32 B (13),  33(1), 33(2)(a), 33(2)

(c), 35(2), 36, 37, 40, 41B(3) of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 2023, as ultra virus  of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India, holding them inapplicable to the Minority Schools of the petitioner, mentioned in the Annexure to this petition, or pass such further or other orders as it may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, and thus render justice.

 

Solemnly affirmed at Chennai

on this the  31^st   day of  March, 2023,  and signed  her  name in my presence.

 

 

 

Before me,

 

 

Advocate, Chennai